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COMMENTS
PUBLIC INSPECTION OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL
EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS:
"EVERYBODY, PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING,
ANYTIME, EXCEPT .... "I
"Freedom of information," as a concept heralding public access to docu-
ments and data in the possession of executive agencies and departments,
became a national catchword with the enactment of the federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) in 1966.2 Yet, FOIA is neither the first nor the last
word on public inspection of government data. As early as 1849, Wisconsin
had provided for a statutory right of inspection of public records3 and the
annals of nineteenth century common law contain many adjudications of con-
flicts involving individuals seeking access to government papers.4 In the decade
since FOIA, twenty-four states have enacted or substantially revised open
records statutes. 5 While FOIA has been cited as the model for a number of
these acts, 6 the experience of sister states appears to have provided a more
1. 36 Ore. Att'y Gen. Rep. 553 (1974).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V., 1975). For a discussion of
FOIA and an analysis of its goals at its inception see Kass, The New Freedom of Information
Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 667 (1967) and Sobeloff, The Freedom of Information Act, 54 A.B.A.J. 709
(1968). For a general review of the first decade of the FOIA experience see K. Davis,
Administrative Law of the Seventies §§ 3A.1-.34 (1976).
3. L. Amico, State Open Records Laws: An Update 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Amico]
(published by the Freedom of Information Center, Columbia, Mo.).
4. E.g., Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282 (1889); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams,
41 N.J.L. 332 (1879); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893).
5. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-121.01-.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976), amending Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 39-121 to -122 (1974); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2801 to -2807 (1968); Cal. Gov't Code §§
6250-61 (West Supp. 1976), as amended, Law of Sept. 8, 1976, ch. 822, [1976] Cal. Stats. 2130;
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-72-201 to -206 (1974); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15 to -21k (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §§ 10001-5 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 119.01-.12
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 92-50 to -52 (Supp. 1975); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 68A. 1-.9
(1973), as amended, Iowa Code Ann. § 65A.5 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
61.870-.884 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, §§ 401-10 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Md.
Ann. Code art. 76A, §§ 1-6 (1975); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 24.201-.223 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 91-A:1-:8 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85-89 (McKinney
Supp. 1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974), as amended, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 132-1 to -9
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 192.410-.500 (1975); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-20 to -20.4
(Cum. Supp. 1976), as amended, Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 608, [1976] S.C. Acts 1629-30; Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 15-304 to -307 (1973), as amended, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 15-305 to -308 (Supp.
1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a (Cum. Supp. 1976); VL Stat. Ann. tit. 1, §§
315-20 (Cum. Supp. 1976), tit. 3, §§ 801-02 (1972); Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-340 to -346 (1973), as
amended, Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-341 to -346.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§
42.17.010-.020, .250-.340 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-692.1-.5 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6. E.g., Cook v. Craig, 55 Cal. App. 3d 773, 781, 127 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716 (3d Dist. 1976);
Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 652, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (3d Dist. 1974)
("The California Public Records Act was apparently modeled after the 1966 federal statute known
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frequent and fertile source for most of the recent legislation. 7
As a matter of terminology, freedom of information statutes may encompass
more than mere enunciation of a statutory right of public inspection. Open
meeting legislation, sometimes called sunshine laws, has been enacted in
conjunction with open records acts as part of a broad freedom of information
framework.8 This Comment will not discuss this latter legislation. Rather, it
will attempt to characterize and assess the present state of the law-governed
by statute in 48 states and by common law in two9-regarding rights of public
as the Freedom of Information Act... although with selected differences."); Burke v. Yudelson,
81 Misc. 2d 870, 877, 368 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51 App. Div. 2d 673, 378
N.Y.S.2d 165 (4th Dep't 1976) ("the New York law was patterned after the Federal Freedom of
Information Act"); Jensen v. Schiffman, 24 Ore. App. 11, -, 544 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1976) ("The
analogy between the federal statute and our Oregon statute . . . is clear and there is even some
indication ... that the pre-1974 version of the former served as a model in drafting the latter.");
59 Md. Att'y Gen. Rep. 59, 61 (1974) ("it would appear that the Maryland statute is patterned
after the federal statute'); Marino, The New York Freedom of Information Law, 43 Fordham L.
Rev. 83 (1974) (the New York statute was "[p]atterned after the Federal Freedom of Information
Act").
7. E.g., compare the 1968 Colorado Public Records statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
24-72-201 to -206 (1974) with the Maryland Public Information law, Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, §§
1-6 (1975). The apparent modeling is evidenced by a clerical error in the drafting of the original
Maryland statute, Law of May 21, 1970, ch. 698, § 3(E)(F), (1970] Md. Laws 1974 (repealed
April 9, 1974). This statute refers to district courts. Id. However, the Maryland court system
contains no district courts, as Colorado does, but, rather, circuit courts of counties. The error was
corrected by the substitution of "circuit court of the county" for "district court of equity
jurisdiction of the district" in Law of April 9, 1974, ch. 216, §§ (e), (f), [1974] Md. Laws 860. See
also text accompanying notes 203-10 infra.
8. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2801 to -2807 (1968); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §§ 10001-5 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 5-14-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1974); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 91-A: 1-:8
(Supp. 1975); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-20.1-.4 (Cum. Supp. 1976), as amended, Law of May 19,
1976, ch. 608, [1976] S.C. Acts 1629-30; Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-340 to -346 (1973), as amended,
Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-341 to -346.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). For an analysis of state sunshine laws see
Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In! Open-Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in
State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. Rev. 480 (1973).
Sunshine laws are now the subject of federal legislation. Act of Aug. 31, 1976, Pub. L. 94-409,
90 Stat. 1241, to be codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
9. The two common law jurisdictions are Mississippi and Rhode Island. The relevant statutes
are: Ala. Code tit. 41, §§ 145-47 (1959); Alaska Stat. §§ 09.25.110-.120 (1973), as amended,
Alaska Stat. § 09.25.125 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-121 to -122 (1974), as
amended, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-121.01-.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2801
to -2807 (1968); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 6250-61 (West Supp. 1976), as amended, Law of Sept. 8,
1976, ch. 822, [1976] Cal. Stats. 2130; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-72-201 to -206 (1974); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15 to -21k (Cum. Supp. 1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §§ 10001-05 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 119.01-.12 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 40-2701 to
-2703 (1975); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 92-21, -50 to -52 (Supp. 1975); Idaho Code §§ 9-301 to -302
(1948), 59-1009 (1976); 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 116, §§ 43.4-.28, .101-.103a, 113 (Smith-Hurd Cum.
Supp. 1977); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 5-14-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1974); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 68A.1-.9 (1973),
as amended, Iowa Code Ann. § 68A.5 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-201 to -203
(1973), as amended, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-201 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
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inspection of documents, data and other information containing materials in
the possession of state and municipal executive (as opposed to legislative or
judicial) departments and agencies.
I. BACKGROUND-PUBLIC INSPECTION AT EARLY COMMON LAW
In the vast majority of states, early law on public inspection of government
documents was judicial in origin. Prior to 1940 only twelve states' 0 had
statutes which resembled those presently in force. However, even these were
usually one or two sentences in length and lacked any interpretive definitions
or guidelines." It was not until the post-war period, when the first Hoover
61.870-.884 (Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44:1-:7, :31-:39 (1951), as amended, La.
Rev. Stat. §§ 44:1-:10, :32 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, §§ 401-10 (Cum. Supp.
1976); Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, §§ 1-6 (1975); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26), ch. 66, § 10
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 24.201-.223, 750.492 (Cum. Supp. 1976),
750.491 (1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.17 (1967), as amended, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.17(4) (1968);
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 109.180-.190 (Vernon 1966); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 59-512, 93-1001-1 to
-6 (1970); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1280 (1975), 84-712 to -712.03 (1971); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 239.10,
.020, .030 (1975); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 91-A.1-:8 (Supp. 1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1A-1 to
-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 71-5-1 to -3 (1961), as amended, N.M. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 71-5-1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85-89 (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974), as amended, N.C. Gen. Stats. §§ 132-1 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 149.43, .99 (Page 1969); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 51, § 24 (1962); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 192.410-.500 (1975); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4
(1959), as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, § 66.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-20 to
-20.6 (Cum. Supp. 1976), as amended, Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 608, [1976] S.C. Acts 1629-30,
S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 1-27-1 to -3 (1974); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 15-304 to -307 (1973), as
amended, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 15-305 to -308 (Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6252-17a (Cum. Supp. 1976); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 to -3 (1953), as amended, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-26-2 (Supp. 1975); VL Stat. Ann. tit. 1, §§ 315-20 (Cum. Supp. 1976), tit. 3, §§ 801-02
(1972); Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-340 to -346 (1973), as amended, Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-340.1 to
-346.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 42.17.010-.020, .250-.340 (Supp. 1975);
W.Va. Code Ann. § 29A-2-2 (1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 19.21 (1972), 59.14 (1957), as amended,
,Vis. Stat. Ann. §§ 19.21, 59.14 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Vyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-692.1-.5 (Cum. Supp.
1975). Most of these statutes, along with a District of Columbia Commissioner's Order relative to
open records, are reprinted in full and individually commented upon in Amico, supra note 3. The
study also contains two model open records acts from which the act offered in Appendix I has
been in large part derived. The summary table of state open records act, offered in Appendix 11,
has also largely been derived from a similar table on page 205 of the Amico study.
10. Ala. Code tit. 41, §§ 145-47 (1959); Act of March 12, 1872, § 1032, printed in [1872] Cal.
Pol. Code 183 (repealed August 29, 1968) (now Cal. Gov't Code §§ 6250-61 (West Supp. 1976));
Idaho Code §§ 9-301, 59-1009 (1948); Iowa Code § 622.46 (1950); Act of May 15, 1851, ch. 161, §
4, [1851] Mass. Acts and Resolves 656, Act of April 24, 1857, ch. 84, § 3, [1857] Mass. Acts and
Resolves 454 (now Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26) (1973), ch. 66, § 10 (Cum. Supp. 1977));
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 59-512 (1970), 93-1001-4 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-712 (1971); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 239.010 (1975); Law of February 17, 1909, ch. 51, § 66, [1909] N.Y. Laws 19 (text
printed in ch. 47, § 66, [1909] N.Y. Consol. Laws 3390) (repealed May 29, 1974); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 132-6 (Supp. 1974); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 1-27-1 (1974); Law of May 8, 1917, ch. 178,
§ 2, [1917] Wis. Laws 329.
11. E.g., the following language Act of March 12, 1872, § 1032, printed in [1872] Cal. Pol.
Code 183 (repealed August 29, 1968) and Idaho Code § 59-1009 (1948): "The public records and
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Study Report led to the enactment of the Federal Records Act of 1950,12 that
impetus was given to open records statutes on a national basis.1 3
The common law rules regarding public inspection rights of government-
held documents developed largely in response to evidentiary requirements of
litigants rather than as a monitoring process of public servants.1 4 Con-
sequently, they were very narrow. The early rule emerged that
there is no common law right in all persons to inspect public documents or records;
and that right, if it exists, depends entirely on the statutory grant. But at common law,
every person is entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public
records ... provided he has an interest therein which is such as would enable him to
maintain or defend an action for which the document or record sought can furnish
evidence or necessary information.'s
The nature of the interest required gradually became less personal: acting
on behalf of a broader public interest (such as investigating official miscon-
duct or a taxpayer's interest in a city's financial condition 6 ) became sufficient.
other matters in the office of any officer are at all times during office hours open to the In-
spection of any citizen of this State." The language of Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 59-512 (1970)
is very similar, with "any person" substituted for "any citizen of this State." E.g.,
the following identical language in Law of ch. 383, § 219, [1873-74] Cal. Code Am. 381
(repealed August 29, 1968), Ala. Code tit. 41, § 145 (1959), Idaho Code § 9-301 (1948) and Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1001-4 (1970): "Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any
public writing ["writings" in Montana] of this state, except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute." Courts confronted with specific controversies regarding inspection of certain documents
found the above language of very little assistance in ascertaining legislative intent and reaching
the merits of the controversy without significant judicial policy-making. See, e.g., Holcombe v.
State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739 (1941); Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 423
P.2d 193, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967) (en banc); cf. State ex rel. Halloran v. McGrath, 104 Mont.
490, 67 P.2d 838 (1937).
12. 64 Stat. 583 (1950).
13. Testimony of Charles Hinds, Director of Kentucky State Department of Libraries and
Archives, Hearings Before the Open Records Subcomm. of the Ky. Joint Interim Comm. on State
Government, Frankfort, Ky., December 9, 1974 at 28 [hereinafter cited as Kentucky hearings].
Particular judicial expressions of common law also served as an impetus for subsequent statutory
enactment. For example, the Kentucky case of City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews,
Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1974), promulgated a detailed restatement of Kentucky common law
on inspection rights written in almost statutory language. Id. at 815-16. This case was cited as a
starting point for the revision of a series of bills previously introduced on the subject in the state.
Kentucky hearings, supra at 3-5. An open records statute was in fact passed by the legislature on
March 30, 1976, repealing a more limited open records act, Law- of March 27, 1958, ch. 49, § 25,
[1958] Ky. Acts 150, which did not apply to the facts of City of St. Matthews. Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 61.870-.884 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
14. H. Cross, The People's Right to Know 25 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Cross].
15. Fayette Co. v. Martin, 279 Ky. 387, 396, 130 S.W.2d 838, 843 (1939), overruled, City of
St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1974), quoting 23 R.C.L. §
10, at 160. Accord, State ex rel. Donahue v. Holbrook, 136 Conn. 691, 73 A.2d 924 (1950);
Nowack v. Auditor General, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928); Egan v. Board of Water
Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893).
16. See generally State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948 (1903);
Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 63 A. 146 (1906).
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Indeed, a number of jurisdictions began to abrogate the interest requirement
entirely.17 Nevertheless, absent a statute, the requirement of an interest in the
document itself generally remains a prerequisite to inspection.1 8
Another factor limiting public access at common law was the narrow
definition of "public records," again due largely to the evidentiary context in
which the issue of public inspection originally arose.' 9 The record or docu-
ment sought generally had to be one which was required by law to be made,
necessary to be kept in discharge of a duty imposed by law, or directed by law
to serve as a memorial of something written, said or done. 20 A number of
more liberal definitions-e.g., "where such writings constitute a convenient,
appropriate or customary method of discharging the duties of the office ' "2 1-
can be found in early case law, but they remained an exception to the
majority view.
One development apart from liberalization of common law principles or the
enactment of open records laws which facilitated public inspection in a
limited context was the enactment of civil pretrial discovery procedures.2 2
These devices and any common law right of inspection have not been
abrogated by legislation relative to general public inspection. 23 Thus, a seeker
17. See, e.g., Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282 (1889); MacEwan v. Holm, 226
Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961) (en banc).
18. The principle was reaffirmed in Rhode Island as recently as 1976 in Daluz v. Hawksley,
SRIL -, 351 A.2d 820 (1976), where the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that "this court
recognizes the common law right of inspection by a proper person or his agent provided he has an
interest therein which is such as would enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the
document or record sought can furnish evidence or necessary information." Id. at -, 351 A.2d at
823 (emphasis deleted).
19. See Cross, supra note 14, at 26-29; see text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
20. E.g., Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952); Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94
So. 615 (1922); Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152 N.W.2d 833 (1967); Steiner v. McMillan, 59
Mont. 30, 195 P. 836 (1921). See Cross, supra note 14, at 30, 39-47.
21. International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 371, 29 N.W.2d 730, 735 (1947) (emphasis
added).
22. Such discovery rules and procedures operate wholly apart from any general principles
relative to inspection by the public-at-large. Thus, their liberalizing provisions are only available
to the specific parties to the civil litigation. See, e.g., Law of June 3, 1975, No. 75-342, § 6, [19751
Conn. Acts 447; Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 506, 160 N.W.2d 135, 137 (1968);
Society for the Protection of N.H. Forests v. Water Supply and Pollution Control Comm'n, 115
N.H. 193, -, 337 A.2d 788, 790 (1975); Irval Realty Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 61
N.J. 366, 372, 294 A.2d 425, 428 (1972). Pretrial discovery of the state's evidence in criminal
proceedings is generally not available to the accused. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942); State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 191-92, 134 S.E.2d 334, 340-41 (1964); 1971 Ohio Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 71-053, at 2-179 to -183.
23. People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 1ll. App. 2d 372, 374-75, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1962);
Irval Realty Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 61 N.J. 366, 371-72, 294 A.2d 425, 428 (1972).
But cf. Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 429-30 n.10, 292 A.2d 395, 398
n.10 (1972); ,Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 349-50, 141 A.2d 844, 848-49 (1958).
One exception seems to be Missouri where the pre-statutory common law enunciation of both a
definition of public records and the nature of the right of inspection seems to be broader than the
subsequently enacted open records statute. A 1955 case, Disabled Police Veterans Club v. Long,
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of a particular record or document would be well-advised to assert any
common law or discovery principles which might be applicable to his particu-
lar situation.2 4
A general open records act is never the only state law governing public
inspection of records or documents. Rather, state codes contain numerous
specific statutes declaring particular documents to be public or open to
inspection, whether or not such documents meet any general definition of
public records. 25 There also exist equal numbers of state laws declaring
certain documents to be confidential and closed, or otherwise expressly
limiting general public inspection. 2 6 All general state open records acts, by
279 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), defined public records as "not only papers expressly
required to be kept by a public officer but all written memorials made by a public officer within
his authority where such writings constitute a convenient, appropriate or customary method of
discharging the duties of the office." Id. at 223. The right of inspection was ruled as belonging to
all persons. Id. In Mo. Ann. Stat. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966), enacted originally as Law of July 19,
1961, S.B. 284, § 1, [1961] Mo. Laws 548, the right was made available only to "any citizen of
Missouri" and the term public records is defined much more narrowly as "all state, county and
municipal records kept pursuant to statute or ordinance. . . ." No cases have arisen subsequent
to the enactment in which the seeming inconsistency has been at issue. Attorney General
opinions, however, have clearly ignored the language of Disabled Police Veterans Club in favor
of the legislative definition. E.g., Edwin M. Bode, Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 38, March 22, 1972;
E. J. Cantrell, Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 114, January 29, 1970. For another example of a record
previously available for public inspection, but closed under the terms of a subsequently enacted
open records act, see Person-Wolinsky Assocs. v. Nyquist, 84 Misc. 2d 930, 377 N.Y.S.2d 897
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (lists of applicants for New York State's certified public accountant's examina-
tion).
24. For a case where inspection was denied on a "public records" theory but ruled in dicta to
be open in appropriate cases under the state's pretrial discovery rules, see Kottschade v.
Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 506, 160 N.W.2d 135, 138 (1968).
25. The following cases constitute examples of such statutes being applied in the resolution of
specific controversies relative to inspection: Gaspard v. Whorton, 239 Ark. 849, 394 S.W.2d 621
(1965) (lists of applications for absentee ballots and related data); Providence Journal Co. v Shea,
110 R.I. 342, 292 A.2d 856 (1972) (state water pollution control investigation records); Sigety v.
Horan, 50 App. Div. 2d 779, 376 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1st Dep't 1975) (financial and inspection reports
of residential health care facilities filed with or issued by the Welfare Department); Martinez v.
Libous, 85 Misc. 2d 186, 378 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (Code Enforcement Bureau's
investigation records of a tenant's apartment).
26. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153-A-98 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-135.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1976). The following cases constitute examples of such statutes being applied over the
terms of the state open records act: Lechner v. Holmberg, 165 Conn. 152, 328 A.2d 701 (1973)
(records of police, prosecuting attorney and criminal proceedings of an acquitted individual);
McMullen v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973) (names, addresses and amounts
received by public assistance recipients); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973)
(jury list); Eugene Cervi & Co. v. Russell, 31 Colo. App. 525, 506 P.2d 748 (1972), aff'd, 184
Colo. 282, 519 P.2d 1189 (1974) (en banc) (vital statistics records); Getter v. Yanks, 290 So. 2d
543 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (insurance agent termination notice filed with state insurance depart-
ment); Shanahan v. Board of Educ., 118 N.J. Super. 212, 287 A.2d 181 (App. Div. 1972) (formal
poll list). The open records acts themselves also generally contain specific exemptions from the
mandate of disclosure. These are discussed in section IV infra.
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their explicit terms, defer to the latter2 7 and, either explicitly or through
interpretation, to the former as well. 28 However, these specific laws are
relatively self-explanatory and will not be examined in this Comment.2 9
II. GENERAL APPROACH AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMiEWORK
In analyzing any controversy regarding an individual's right of access to a
particular government document, there are four questions that must be
affirmatively answered before inspection will be granted or compelled. 30
1. Is the document in question a "public record"?
2. If the document constitutes a public record, is the document open to
general public inspection?
3. If the document constitutes a public record open to general public
inspection, is the seeker within the class of individuals to whom inspection
rights are accorded?
4. Is there an adequate judicial remedy (along with corresponding en-
forcement and penalty provisions) for unjustified denial of access to public
records? 31
27. See note 9 supra. However, state and local regulations, resolutions and ordinances,
although specific in terms, do not override a public law enacted by the state legislature. Thus, the
open records act will control in a conflicting situation. E.g., State v. Mayo, 4 Conn. Cir. 511, 236
A.2d 342 (1967) (local building code); Bzozowski v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 107
N.J. Super. 467, 259 A.2d 231 (Law Div. 1969) (board regulation); Moak v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 18 Pa Commw. Ct. 599, 336 A.2d 920 (197S) (Philadelphia Home Rule
Charter); Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668
(Tex. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-840).
28. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 24.222(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §
88(1)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 14(b) (Cum. Supp.
1976); see also note 25 supra. This constitutes nothing more than an application of the general
principle of statutory interpretation that when a general and a specific piece of legislation are in
conflict, the terms of the specific will control. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
153 (1976); Simpson v. Cranston, 56 Cal. 2d 63, 362 P.2d 492, 13 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1961).
29. Additionally, this Comment will not consider court and legislative records, or those of
consultants or other entities which have only tangential relations with government. These records
are generally the subject of particular specific statutes and are not incorporated as such into the
state open records acts discussed herein. Examples of such specific statutes include N.D. Cent
Code § 27-07-36 (1960) (inspection of county court records) and W. Va. Code Ann. § 51-4-2 (1966)
(inspection of state court records). However, the Kentucky open records statute, Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 61.870(1) (Supp. 1976), enacted in 1976, includes records of "every legislative board,
commission, committee and officer, every. . . court or judicial agency ... any other body...
which derives at least twenty-five per cent (25%) of its funds from state or local authority" vithin
its purview. See also note 41 infra and accompanying text.
30. Derived from Cross, supra note 14, at 19.
31. As this study is substantive rather than procedural, primary attention will be focused on
questions 1-3. The vast majority of statutes provide for across-the-board nondiscretionary
remedial relief. Even those which employ the traditional discretionary writ of mandamus as the
vehicle to redress an aggrieved applicant's right to inspection (e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-712.03
(1971)) have generally been interpreted as providing for an almost automatic right to obtain the
writ when statutory requirements have been met. Examples include Mulford v. Davey, 64 Nev.
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III. Is THE DOCUMENT A "PUBLIC RECORD"?
"Public record" may be defined as a document either specifically declared
public or open to inspection by a specific state statute, 32 or falling within the
terms of a general definition of public record used by the state relative to
general public inspection rights.
The classification of a document as a public record constitutes the thresh-
hold and primary issue in a particular controversy. The classification is
especially important if the document can attain public record status only by
meeting the terms of a general definition adopted by the state for inspection
purposes. 33 In such cases, the document will be presumptively open, and the
burden will fall on the custodian to justify nondisclosure. 34
State statutory definitions of public records vary widely and, consequently,
an attempt will be made to categorize them. However, three caveats must be
noted. First, not all documents in a public body's files will constitute public
records. 35 Some documents which constitute public records under the terms of
an open records statute have been exempted from disclosure. These may
be available to specified individuals, 36 may be permissibly disclosed by an
506, 186 P.2d 360 (1947); Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 518-19, 153 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1967)
("Mandamus is the proper remedy to test the reasons for withholding documents or records from
inspection."). See also Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1356 (1929). One recent case went so far as to remove
the traditional equitable discretionary maxims surrounding the writ of mandamus from the open
records context. Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d
668, 674-75 (Tex. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No.
76-840) (inspection may not be denied for "unclean hands"). The statutory remedial provisions
and the issues of enforcement and penalty provisions are discussed more fully in section VI Infra.
32. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
33. By the terms of the New York statute, N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85-89 (McKlnney
Supp. 1976), this appears unlikely. Rather than promulgate a general definition of public records
presumptively open to inspection, and then statutorily demarcate specific exemptions, the New
York act lists eight specific categories of documents and data which the agency must disclose as
well as any additional information mandated to be open by terms of any other law. By
implication, a document not within one of these categories (such as a highly specialized document
of first impression) would be presumptively closed to inspection. See N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §
88 (McKinney Supp. 1976). This statutory definition is discussed further at note 49 infra.
34. Four states specifically provide for such a presumption within their open records statutes.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.880(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 66, § 10(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.490(1) (1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.340 (Supp.
1975). In the other states, this may be inferred from the nature of the acts themselves, I.e.,
defining certain documents as "public records" for purposes of inspection. See also note 198 Infra
and accompanying text.
35. Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152 N.W.2d 833 (1967); Town Crier, Inc. v. Chief of
Police, 361 Mass. 682, 282 N.E.2d 379 (1972). See note 26 supra and accompanying text. An
open records act may declare certain documents as not public records for inspection purposes.
E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat Ann. § 1-19b (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
36. For example of parties who are the subject of the record, see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 24-72-204(2)(a)(fl), (3)(a) (1974); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.07(2)(c) (Supp. 1976) (certain licensing
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agency,37 or may become available to the general public under certain
circumstances. 38 Second, a record may be public for some purposes but not
for others.39 For example, state statutes dealing with the physical manage-
ment or destruction of obsolete public records often contain definitions of
public records in providing for which documents are subject to their terms.
These definitions are frequently much broader than those contained in the
state's open records act.40 Finally, not all state-affiliated organizations will
meet the definition of "agency" within an open records act.4 1 Consulting firms
and quasi-public corporations are most frequently outside the terms of open
records acts.4 2 However, those executive and municipal agencies which are
examination data available only to individual examinee); Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 3(b)(ii)
(1975); 58 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 65, 69 (1975) (reports of mental examinations of school children are
public records as to the parents or guardians of the child only); 36 Ore. Att'y Gen. Rep. 553, 559
(1974) (personnel files open only to employee-subject of file); 1973 Pa. Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 47
(school records available to the student or his parents only).
37. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(2)(a) (1974); Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 3(b)
(1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.500 (1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Black
Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 656, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113 (3d Dist. 1974).
38. For example, when, under permissive exemption provisions, they are voluntarily dis-
closed but only to certain segments of the public. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(2)(b)
(1974); Quad-City Community News Service, Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8, 15 (S.D. Iowa
1971); Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 656-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113 (3d
Dist. 1974).
39. E.g., Losavio v. Mayber, 178 Colo. 184, 187-88, 496 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1972) (en banc);
MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961) (en banc).
40. E.g., Kansas' open records act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-201 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides: "All
official public records ... which records by law are required to be kept and maintained, except
[exceptions]... shall at all times be open for a personal inspection by any citizen . . . ." Kansas'
disposition of records statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-3501 (1969) provides: "For purposes of this act:
'Records' means all documents, correspondence, original papers, maps, drawings, charts, indexes,
plans, memoranda, sound recordings, microfilm, motion-picture or other photographic records, or
other materials bearing upon the activities and functions of the department or agency or its officers
or employees." Compare also Mo. Ann. Stat. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966) (open records act) with Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 109.210 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976) (State and Local Records Law) and S.D. Compiled
Laws Ann. § 1-27-1 (1974) (records open to public inspection) with S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §
1-27-9 (1974) (records management programs). In New Jersey, a juxtaposition of the open records
statute with the Destruction of Public Records Law definition has resulted in a broad judicial
liberalization of the state definition of public records for inspection purposes. See note 103 infra.
Note, however, that when an open records law provides no definition of public records, courts wil
then look to other statutory definitions of the term in construing the law. E.g., Menge v. City of
Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 536-37, 311 A.2d 116, 118 (1973); Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 82
N.M. 672, 674-75, 486 P.2d 608, 610-11 (1971).
41. E.g., State ex rel. Tindel v. Sharpe, 300 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (per
curiam) (consultant not within the definition of agency under the Florida open records act);
Bradbury v. Shaw, - N.H. -, 360 A.2d 123 (1976) (general rule); Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v.
Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543, 546 (N.D. 1960) (county courts not subject to terms of state open records
act).
42. See notes 29 and 41 supra and accompanying text.
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the subject of this Comment will fall within the mandate of such a statute
unless otherwise stated.
A. A Classification of Statutory Definitions
of Public Records from Strict to Liberal43
a. A Limited Class of Specifically Identifiable Documents or a General
Definition of Records but Limited for Public Inspection Purposes by Specific
Qualifications.
States in this category include Illinois, 44 Michigan's Administrative Proce-
dures Act of 1969,45 Nebraska,4 6 New York,41 and Pennsylvania. 48 The
43. A number of states define public records in alternative terms. These states will be
classified in the broader of the categories because, as a general rule, these may be assumed to be
all-encompassing of the classes narrower to them.
44. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 116, §§ 43.4-.28, .101-.114 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977). The
Illinois open records act contains separate provisions for state and local records. The State
Records Act contains a broad general definition of records: "all [documents] ... made, produced,
executed or received by any agency in the State in pursuance of state law or in connection with
the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or
its successor as evidence of the organization, function, policies, decisions, procedures, operations,
or other activities of the State or the State Government, or because of the informational data
contained therein." Id. § 43.5. For inspection purposes, however, public records are defined in
qualified terms as "[r]eports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the
State . . . ." Id. § 43.6. The definition of local public records is similarly qualified. Id. § 43.103,
.103a. A number of Illinois cases speak of a "common law right to inspect and use public records"
in Illinois. E.g., People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378
(1962). No cases have been found defining the common law right or definition of public records
aside from a ruling that "some final action be taken before a record takes on the status of 'public
record,"' thus eliminating preliminary drafts and agency memoranda from the definition. People
ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094, 309 N.E.2d 362,
365 (1973). See also People ex rel. Hamer v. Board of Educ., 130 Ill. App. 2d 592, 264 N.E.2d
420 (1970) and section I1(B) infra.
A comprehensive open records statute was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly In 1975
as House Bill 452, "An Act to Require Access to Certain Information," reprinted in Amico, supra
note 3, at 96-106. The bill defined public records in broad terms ("all ... documentary materials,
regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been or being prepared, used, received, in
the possession of, or under the control of any public body.") Id. at 99. The bill was not passed
through the 79th General Assembly in 1976.
45. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 24.201-.223 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This act is an adjunct to
Michigan's open records statute, which relates to county, city or township records. Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 750.491 (1968), .492 (Cum. Supp. 1976), discussed in note 76 infra. This adjunct
statute, the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, is somewhat similar to New York's
statute (N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85-89 (McKinney Supp. 1976) discussed in note 49 infra) In
providing for explicit categories of documents mandated to be available for public inspection. The
adjunct act is limited in application to state executive agencies (defined in § 24.203(2)) and the
records available are: "(a) Final orders or decisions in contested cases and the records on which
they were made. (b) Promulgated rules [defined in § 24.207(7)]. (c) Other written statements
which implement or interpret law, rules or policy . . . ." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 24.221(1)
(Supp. 1976). The Act is interpreted and discussed in Citizens for Better Care v. Department of
Public Health, 51 Mich. App. 454, 215 N.W.2d 576 (1974).
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common factor in these states is that a document can be a public record only
if it is capable of being pegged into an established category. The universe of
available documents is thus specifically limited. This approach seems to
negate any presumption that a document is public as, in effect, the burden is
placed on the seeker to establish its classification within the prescribed
classes. Seekers of specialized and first impression documents may face an
insurmountable task since established categories of documents have become
increasingly inadequate to engulf all government data.49
46. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-712.01 (1971) which defines public records as "any state, county or
political subdivision fiscal records, audit, warrant, voucher, invoice, purchase order, requisition,
payroll, check, receipt or other record of receipt, cash or expenditure involving public funds
47. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85-89 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
48. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976) which defines public records as: "Any
account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or disbursement of funds by an agency or its
acquisition, use or disposal of services or of supplies, materials, equipment or other property and
any minute, order or decision by an agency fixing the personal or property rights, privileges,
immunities, duties or obligations of any person or group of persons ...." The limiting language
was used to deny public record status to personnel files and thereby deny inspection to the subject
of the files in West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 615, 353 A.2d 93 (1976).
See also Westmoreland County Bd. of Assess. Appeals v. Montgomery, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. SO,
321 A.2d 660 (1974); Friedman v. Fumo, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 609, 309 A.2d 75 (1973); McMullen
v. Secretary of Welfare, 3 Pa. Commw. CL 574, 284 A.2d 334 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 453
Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974). Further exemptions from
the definition are also included in the statute, most notably "any record ... access to... which
would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person's reputation or personal security. . .
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, § 66.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This provision is discussed in note 108 infra.
49. The New York open records statute is an example. The act lists eight specific categories
of documents that must be made available for public inspection and copying, in addition to any
documents required to be open by the terms of another statute. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 88(I)
(McKinney Supp. 1976). There is neither a general definition of "public records" in the statute nor
any additional language to extend the mandate of availability beyond these eight limited classes.
Thus, a person seeking inspection of a unique or specialized document pursuant to the act seems
required to fit the item sought into one of the eight promulgated categories of public records,
unless he can demonstrate disclosure is mandated elsewhere. None of the New York cases to date
have called attention to this prerequisite and inspection has been denied on grounds of falling
within the statutory exemptions from disclosure, rather than as not being classifiable within one
of the eight categories of public records. E.g., Knight v. Gold, 53 App. Div. 2d 694, 385
N.Y.S.2d 123 (2d Dep't 1976); Person-Wolinsky Assocs., Inc. v. Nyquist, 84 Misc. 2d 930, 377
N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Fitzpatrick v. County of Nassau, 83 Misc. 2d 884, 372 N.Y.S.2d
939 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also Dunlea v. Goldmark, 85 Misc. 2d 198, 380 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. CL
1976). Only one other New York statute deals in general terms with public inspection of
government documents and, although somewhat broader in definition ("papers connected with or
used or filed in the office of, or with any officer, board or commission"), is limited in application
to employees of local government only, with inspection available only to "any taxpayer or
registered voter." N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
Compare New York's former open records act, Law of February 17, 1909, ch. 51, § 66, [1909
N.Y. Laws 19 (text printed in ch. 47, § 66, [1909] N.Y. Consol. Laws 3390 (repealed May 29,
1974)) which provided: "A person, having the custody of the records or other papers in a public
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b. Records Required to be Made by Law, Necessary to be Kept in the
Discharge of a Duty Imposed by Law, or Directed by Law to Serve as a
Written Memorial of Something Written, Said or Done.50
States in this category include Arkansas, 51 Hawaii,
52 Indiana,5 3 Kansas, 54
New Jersey,5 5 Ohio, 56 Oklahoma5 7 and South Dakota. 8 This definition,
identical to that which tended to emerge at common law,5 9 requires that there
be a specific statute mandating that a particular document be made or kept,
or one which clearly implies a necessity. 60 This category will, therefore, bring
into play a battery of other statutes. It may be considered broader than
category "a as no specific placement within a class of records need be
established. Additionally, any subsequent legislation relating to maintenance
of documents or any creation of new document-producing agencies will
automatically bring new material within the definition. The mere fact that the
document is required or necessary to be made will create a presumption of
office, within this state, must, upon request. . diligently search the files . . . and either make
one or more transcripts therefrom, and certify to the correctness thereof . . . or certify that a
document or paper, of which the custody legally belongs to him, can not be found." Id. In
connection with this former statuto.-y right in New York, see Winston v. Mangan, 72 Misc. 2d
280, 338 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972) which reviews the case law and gropes for a definition of
public records within this earlier law.
In its approach to defining public records open for inspection by eschewing a general definition
of public records in favor of specific categories, New York alone among the forty-eight statutory
jurisdictions parallels FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1975). This unique approach to defining
public records for inspection purposes, common only to New York and FOIA, gives further
credence to the conclusion that it is the sister state experience, and not FOIA, which has provided
the basis for recent state open records legislation. See note 7 supra and accompanying text and
notes 203-10 infra and accompanying text.
50. Derived from Cross, supra note 14, at 42-43.
51. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-2804 (1968).
52. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 92-50 (Supp. 1975), which defines public record as "any written or
printed report, book or paper, map or plan of the State ... which is the property thereof, and In
or on which an entry has been made or is required to be made by law, or which any public officer
or employee has received or is required to receive for filing . . . ." Although there is no case law
under this statute, it seems anomalous that a document not required by law to be made or kept is
not open, but once made and kept voluntarily the right to inspection follows. See also 1968 Ga.
Op. Att'y Gen. 741, 743; 41 N.C. Att'y Gen. Rep. 407-09 (1971).
53. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 5-14-1-2(1) (Bums 1974).
54. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-201 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
55. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976). But see note 108 infra discussing the
subsequent judicial modification of this definition.
56. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 149.43 (Page 1969). This definition lists specific exemptions. Id.
57. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, § 24 (1962).
58. S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 1-27-1 (1974).
59. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
60. State ex rel. Grosser v. Boy, 42 Ohio St. 2d 498, 330 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (per curiam);
Curran v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 22 Ohio Misc. 197, 259 N.E.2d 757 (C.P. 1970); 1968-69
Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 444-50.
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availability. In several states, the document must originate with a public
servant; privately-oriented matters filed with an agency will not ordinarily
qualify as public records under this definition. 6 1
c. Records Made or Received Pursuant to Law or as a Convenient and
Appropriate Mode of Discharging the Duties of an Office.G2
States in this category include Arizona, 63 Missouri, 6 4 Utah, 6s Wisconsin 66
and West Virginia. 67 This category is broader than category "b" in that no
particular statute mandating that the exact document in question be main-
tained is necessary. 68 Apparently, however, the document must have some
reference to an existing law or a customary course of conducL 69
61. See generally Ritchie Lumber Co. v. Nutter, 66 W.Va. 444, 449, 66 S.E. 646, 649 (1909);
1961-62 Me. Op. Att'y Gen. 82-83.
62. Elements of this definition are used by a number of states in promulgating the narrower
of two alternative definitions. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.011 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
15.17(2) (1967); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-341 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
63. Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 78, 251 P.2d 893, 89S (1952); 1973 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen.
78-79. The Arizona open records statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-121 to -122 (1974), as
amended, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-121.01-.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976), promulgates no definition of
public records. See generally Comment, Freedom of Information in Arizona: An Antidote for
Secrecy in Government, 1975 Ariz. State L.J. 111 (1975).
64. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966) ("all state, county and municipal records kept
pursuant to statute or ordinance"). But see E. J. Cantrell, Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 114, Jan. 29,
1970, where the state Attorney General interpreted this language as meaning that such records
must be "required by law to be kept by public officials in this state" in order to meet the
definition.
65. Conover v. Board of Educ., 1 Utah 2d 375, 377, 267 P.2d 768, 770 (1954). The Utah
open records statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 to -3 (1953), as amended, Utah Code Ann. §
78-26-2 (Supp. 1975), promulgates no definition of public records.
66. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.21 (1972), as amended, 'Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.21 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
appears to define public records as "all property and things received from his [the custodian's]
predecessor or other persons and required by law to be friled, deposited, or kept in his office, or
which are in the lawful possession or control of himself or his deputies, or to the possession or
control of which he or they may be lawfully entitled, as such officers." This language was brought
into this classification by judicial construction and interpretation in International Union v.
Gooding, 251 ,Vis. 362, 369-71, 29 N.W.2d 730, 734-35 (1947).
67. State ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass'n v. Kelly, 149 W.Va. 766, 769, 143 S.E.2d 136, 139
(1965), noted in 68 W.Va. L. Rev. 90 (1965); State ex rel. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hunter,
127 W.Va. 738, 742-43, 34 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1945). The West Virginia open records statute,
W.Va. Code Ann. § 29A-2-2 (1976), promulgates no definition of public records.
68. State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 679, 137 N.W.2d 470, 473 (1965),
modified on denial of rehearing, 28 Wis. 2d 685a, 134 N.W.2d 241 (per curiam), aff'd in part and
modified in part, 32 Wis. 2d 11, 144 N.W.2d 793 (1966) (per curiarn); Conover v. Board of Educ., 1
Utah 2d 375, 377, 267 P.2d 768, 770 (1954); International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 370-71,
29 N.W.2d 730, 735 (1947).
69. E.g., International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 370-71, 29 N.W.2d 730, 735 (1947).
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d. Records Made or Received in Connection with the Transaction of Public
or Official Business.
States in this category include Colorado, 70 Delaware, 7 1 Florida, 72 Geor-
gia, 73 Louisiana, 74 Maryland,"7 5 Michigan, 76 Minnesota, 7 7 New Hampshire, 78
New Mexico, 79 North Carolina, 0  Texas,8 1  Vermont,8 2 Virginia,8 3 and
Wyoming.8 4 Under this definition there need be neither a specific statute to
which the document is arguably related nor a prescribed or customary course
of conduct of a public official. All documents made or received by a custodian
are declared open, provided the record is made or received in the course of
performing public or official duties.8 5 Preliminary drafts and memoranda,
70. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-202(6) (1974) ("all writings made, maintained, or kept...
for use in the exercise of functions required or authorized by law or administrative rule or
involving the receipt or expenditure of public funds").
71. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10002(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
72. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.011 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
73. Houston v. Rutledge, 237 Ga. 764,-, 229 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1976) ("documents, papers, and
records prepared and maintained in the course of the operation of a public office are 'public
records' '). The Georgia open records statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 40-2701 to -2703 (1975).
promulgates no definition of public records.
74. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:1 (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("all [diocuments.. .having been used,
being in use, or prepared for use in the conduct, transaction or performance of any business,
transaction, work, duty or function which was conducted, transacted or performed by or under
the authority of the Constitution or the laws of this state").
75. Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § l(a) (1975).
76. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.491 (1968), .492 (Cum. Supp. 1976). "All official books,
papers or records created by or received in any office or agency of the state of Michigan or its
political subdivisions .... Id. § 750.491 (1968). This statute relates to inspection of "county, city
or township" records only. Id. § 750.492 (Cum. Supp. 1976). For a discussion of the Michigan
Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 24.201-.223 (Cum. Supp.
1976), see note 45 supra.
77. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.17(2) (1967).
78. Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 537, 311 A.2d 116, 118 (1973). The New
Hampshire open records statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 91-A:1-:8 (Supp. 1975) promulgates no
definition of public records.
79. Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 82 N.M. 672, 674, 486 P.2d 608, 610 (1971). The New
Mexico open records statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 71-5-1 to -3 (1961), as amended, N.M. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 71-5-1 (Supp. 1975) promulgates no definition of public records.
80. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
81. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, §§ 2(2), 3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This definition
lists specific exemptions. Id.
82. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 317(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976). "[Wjritten or recorded matters
produced or acquired in the course of agency business . . . ." This definition lists specific
exemptions. Id. The Vermont act is also limited in its definition of "public agency." The statute
specifically includes "any agency, board, department, commission, committee, or authority of the
state" but excludes "[t]owns, cities, counties, schools and all subdivisions thereof .... " Id. §
317(a).
83. Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-341(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
84. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
85. The Delaware statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10002(b) (Supp. 1976) defines "public
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which do not fall within the narrower categories, generally come within this
definition of public records. 8 6
e. Any Writing Containing Information Relating to the Conduct of the
Public's Business.
States in this category include California, 7 Connecticut, 8 Maine,8 9 Ore-
gon, 90 South Carolina9 1 and Washington. 92 In this category, there is no
requirement that the document be connected in any way with the official
business of the agency;, it need only relate to public affairs in general.
f. All Documentary Materials in Possession of a Public Body.
States in this category include Alabama, 93 Alaska, 94 Idaho, 95 Iowa, 96
Kentucky, 97 Massachusetts98 and Montana. 99 Most of these statutes are one
business" as "any matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or
advisory power." One example of documents that generally constitute public records under this
definition are personnel records, although such are usually exempt from disclosure by statute.
E.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 6254(c) (West Supp. 1976); Iowa Code Ann. § 68A.7(10), (11) (1973); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 153A-98 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.3(d) (iii) (Cum. Supp. 1975). In
Florida, however, confidential personnel records were apparently open to inspection under
several Attorney General opinions prior to the District Court of Appeal ruling in Wisher v.
News-Press Publishing Co., 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). E.g., 1975 Fla. Att'y Gen.
Annual Rep. 11-12; 1974 Fla. Att'y Gen. Annual Rep. 396-98; 1973 Fla. Att'y Gen. Annual Rep.
82-84, .340-41. This anomaly is discussed more fully in note 128 infra.
86. E.g., State ex rel. Copeland v. Cartwright, 38 Fla. Supp. 6 (Cir. Ct. 1972); Bartels v.
Roussel, 303 So. 2d 833, 837-38 (La. Ct. App. 1974). But cf. Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn.
501, 160 N.W.2d 135 (1968). A number of jurisdictions deal with these documents by express
statutory provision. E.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 6254(a) (West Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
1-19(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.500(2)(a) (1975), discussed in 36 Ore. Atty
Gen. Rep. 556-57 (1974). For a more detailed discussion of preliminary drafts and agency
memoranda-type documents, see section II(B) infra.
87. Cal. Gov't Code § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1976).
88. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-18a(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
89. Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit. 1, § 402(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This definition lists specific
exemptions. Id.
90. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.410(4) (1975).
91. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This definition lists specific exemptions. Id.
92. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.020(26) (Supp. 1975) which defines public record as "any
writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any
governmental or proprietary function .... " Id.
93. Ala. Code tiL 41, § 145 (1959). "Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of
any public writing of this state." Id.
94. Alaska Stat. § 09.25.110 (1973). "TIThe books, records, papers, files, accounts, writings,
and transactions of all agencies and departments are public records." Id.
95. Idaho Code § 59-1009 (1976). "The public records and other matters in the office of any
officer are, at all times during office hours, open to the inspection of any citizen of this state." Id.
See also Idaho Code § 9-301 (1948).
96. Iowa Code Ann. § 68A. 1 (1973). "'[P]ublic records' includes all records and documents of
or belonging to [any agency]." Id.
97. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.870 (Cum. Supp. 1976). "[A]II . . . documentary materials
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or two sentence policy declarations lacking any effective definitions or
guidelines for judicial interpretation. Thus, these laws serve merely as focal
points for judicial common law definitions. z00 Iowa, Kentucky and Mas-
sachusetts contain the broadest statutory definitions of public records but each
statute contains large numbers of exemptions from the statutory disclosure
requirements. 101
Three states, Nevada, 1 0 2 North Dakota 0 3 and Tennessee, 10 4 have not been
classified into the above scheme due to the absence of both a general
definition of public records and any subsequent case-law providing such a
definition. In Mississippi and Rhode Island, the two common law jurisdic-
tions, the courts have not yet provided a definition of public records. 105
The above classification scheme may be of limited assistance in predicting
whether a jurisdiction will classify a particular document as a public record.
Rather, it is hoped that the classification will serve as a rough guide to the
regardless of physical form or characteristics, which are prepared, owned, used, in the possession
of or retained by a public agency." Id.
98. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This definition lists specific
exemptions. Id.
99. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 59-512 (1947). "The public records and other matters in the
office of any officer are at all times, during office hours, open to the inspection of any person." Id.
See also Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1001.1 (1947).
100. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
101. Iowa Code Ann. § 68A.7 (1973); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See note 35 supra and accompanying text and
section IV(C) and Appendix II infra. In general, the more liberal the definition along the
spectrum, the greater the number of specific statutory exemptions within the open records act.
Statutory exemptions from disclosure are discussed more fully in section IV infra.
102. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 239.010 (1975). "All public books and public records ... shall be open
at all times . . . to inspection by any person . . . ." Id.
103. N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18 (1960) "[AII records of public or governmental bodies,
boards, bureaus, commissions or agencies of the state or any political subdivision of the state, or
organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds, or expending public
funds, shall be public records." Id. A 1958 dated opinion of the Attorney General of North
Dakota interpreted this language: "In my opinion this language is all-inclusive and would include
records of official proceedings, reports and other documents that are required by law to be filed
with an agency, and day-to-day correspondence of public officials on matters relating to their
official duties." 1956-58 N.D. Att'y Gen. Biennial Rep. 148. This opinion is also digested in 34
N.D.L. Rev. 432 (1958).
104. Tenn. Code Ann. § 15-304 (1973). However, the Tennessee Public Records Commission
Law defines records for purposes of managing the disposition of state records as documentary
"material regardless of physical form or characteristics made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any government agency."
Tenn. Code Ann. § 15-401(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This category "d" definition (see notes 70-86
supra and accompanying text) might be adopted by a Tennessee court in defining public records
for inspection purposes. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Logan v. Mississippi Abstract Co., 170 Miss. 479, 200 So. 716 (1941) which deals
with statutory inspection rights under an act limited to records of the chancery clerk. None of the
Rhode Island cases on inspection have promulgated a definition of public records. See Daluz v.
Hawksley, - R.I. -, 351 A.2d 820 (1976).
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range of approaches various jurisdictions have adopted to define public
records alid corresponding inspection rights.
In practice, any such system of neat classification will break down into fifty
distinct categories subject to local needs and philosophies. Courts, in inter-
preting legislative intent, will be guided by various "declarations of policy"
contained in a number of the acts. When present, these tend to be sweepingly
liberal and provide impetus toward disclosure. 10 6 Thus, although statutory
definitions may be identical or nearly so, the presence or absence of such a
sweeping policy declaration could be decisive in a borderline case.
Another, and perhaps more compelling reason for a probable breakdown in
these classifications is the equitable discretion vested in the courts. 107 Thus, a
definition, however clear and specific on its face, may be twisted or inter-
preted in a particular instance to do justice in different terms than its framers
may have envisioned.10 8 Indeed, courts in two states having almost identical
106. Fourteen of the statutes contain such declarations. Ark. Star. Ann. § 12-2802 (1968);
Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 (West Supp. 1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-201 (1974); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 119.01 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 5-14-1-1 (Burns 1974); Iowa Code Ann. §
68A.2 (1973); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.882(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ti. 1, §
401 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:IA-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §
85 (McKinney Supp. 1976); Law of June 14, 1972, no. 1396, § 2, [1972] S.C. Acts 2585-86; Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a § I (Cum. Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 315 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.010 (Supp. 1975). The nature of these declarations
vary in length and context from simple one sentence declarations (e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
24-72-201 (1974) (-It is declared to be the public policy of this state that all public records shall be
open for inspection by any person at reasonable times .... .")) to several paragraph philosophical
expressions (e.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 5-14-1-1 (Burns 1974); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 85
(McKinney Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The
Vermont statute balances the public's right to inspect records with the right of privacy of "[a]ll
people." The legislature seems to have implied that the latter interest is primary and should be
protected "unless specific information is needed to review the action of a governmental officer."
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 315 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See also Cal. Gov't Code § 6250 (West Supp.
1976). For examples of courts applying such a balancing test stemming from the statutory
language in California, see Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 651-53, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 106, 110 (3d Dist. 1974); Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493 (4th Dist.
1971). See also 53 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 136, 144-48 (1970). Note that such a balancing test
generally comes into play after the document specifically meets the definition of public record and
the issue has become whether or not it is exempt from disclosure on statutory grounds.
107. An action seeking to compel the public inspection of government-held documents is
essentially equitable in nature. Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 659, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 106, 115 (3d Dist. 1974); Turner v. Reed, 22 Ore. App. 177, 189 n.10, 538 P.2d 373, 379
n.10 (1975).
108. For example, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, seems to have
broadened the state's definition of public records by reading the state open records statute, N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1A-1 to -4 (Cum. Supp. 1976), in pari materia with the state Destruction of
Public Records Law, id. § 47:3-16. Citizens for Better Educ. v. Board of Educ., 124 N.J. Super.
523, 529, 308 A.2d 35, 37-38 (App. Div. 1973), cited with approval in Trenton Times Corp. v.
Board of Educ., 138 N.J. Super. 357, 360-61, 351 A.2d 30, 31-32 (App. Div. 1976) (per curiam)
Nero v. Hyland, 136 N.J. Super. 537, 540, 347 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Law Div. 1975). See also notes
39-40 supra and accompanying text. The Destruction Act defines public records as any document
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definitions have reached different results in similar circumstances. 10 9
B. Do Preliminary Documents and Memoranda Constitute Public Records?
Preliminary documents and agency memoranda present a unique problem
relative to defining public records and exempting certain classes thereof from
disclosure. Under the common law, and in those states adopting category "a"
- "c" definitions of public records, preliminary memoranda and draft docu-
ments generally will not constitute public records. For example, state laws
rarely mandate specifically that preliminary material be made; thus a category
"b" definition cannot encompass such documents."t 0 Definition categories "d"
received "in connection with the transaction of public business and.., retained by such recipient
or its successor as evidence of its activities or because of the information contained therein." N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 47:3-16 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This definition would fall within category "d," as
discussed in notes 70-86 supra and accompanying text, in contrast to the open records definition,
"all records which are required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file ... ." Id. § 47: IA-2
(Cum. Supp. 1976), which comes within category "b." See notes 50-61 supra and accompanying
text.
In Pennsylvania, the state's open records act seems to contain a right of privacy exemption for
any record which, if disclosed, "would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person's
reputation or personal security." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Despite this
language, the state's Commonwealth Court eschewed privacy as the statutory consideration in
construing the clause: "[T]he phrase 'personal security' does not mean 'personal privacy' . . . .
Considerations of privacy and confidentiality, as distinguished from regard for reputation and
personal security, must yield to the public's right to know about and examine into its servants'
performance of duty." Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 495, 500, 329 A.2d 307, 310
(1974). See also Friedman v. Fumo, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 609, 309 A.2d 75 (1973).
109. For example, the Florida and Minnesota statutes both define public records as all
documents "made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of official
["public" in Minnesota] business." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.01(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 15.17(2) (1967). This would be a category "d" definition as discussed in notes 70-86 supra
and accompanying text.
Neither statute makes specific provision as to whether preliminary memoranda and draft
documents meet this definition apart from subject matter. In both states the issue was resolved
judicially and, despite the identical definitions, contrary. results were reached.
In Florida, preliminary site plans prepared by a city planning technician were ruled public
records in State ex rel. Copeland v. Cartwright, 38 Fla. Supp. 6 (Cir. Ct. 1972). A subsequent
appellate case followed Copeland and ruled yet another preliminary document, a written
appraisal report, constituted a public record. Gannett Co., v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1974).
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion when presented with assessor's
"field cards" or work sheets which, although preserved in bound ledgers, were considered
preliminary to less detailed final assessment books. Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 160
N.W.2d 135 (1968). Although conceding that the statutory language, if "read literally," would
encompass these documents, the court limited public records to "official actions as distinguished
from thought processes." Id. at 504, 160 N.W.2d at 138. Constituting only "information relating
to the process by which an assessment is reached" rather than information relating to the
assessment itself, the court denied inspection. Id. at 504-05, 160 N.W.2d at 138.
In none of these cases was the subject matter of the document or any factor other than its
preliminary character a basis for reaching the decision.
110. E.g., Coldwell v. Board of Pub. Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921) (preliminary
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- "f," however, do not impose such mechanical requirements and their
barriers to public record status relate rather to the substantive content of a
document or its relation to a public officer."' Once the procedural require-
ments of a relation to a specific law or standardized course of conduct are thus
removed, any document in the files of a public body-preliminary or final-is
potentially a public record.' 12
In analyzing whether such documents should be subject to inspection, the
focus shifts from content to the stage in the decision-making process at which
the document was prepared. The public policy arguments for withholding
these documents emphasize the need to protect confidentiality and discretion
in administrative processes, rather than trying to determine whether the
document fits within the state's definition. 113 One court described the consid-
erations against disclosure in these terms:
Such a result [disclosure] would impose an intolerable burden on the public officer.
Such an officer must be ever ready to defend his decisions and justify his judgment,
but [making preliminary documents available to inspection] . . . would be an
unreasonable and harmful interference with the day-to-day conduct of public business
just when such officer should, and must, be allowed some discretion in making those
decisions and in exercising that judgment. 114
Although valid, these considerations seem outweighed by the potential for
abuse. An exemption for preliminary documents enables a bureaucrat to
data did not constitute public records but was available as "other matters" under state statute
making "public records and other matters" open to inspection by citizens of the state); Linder v.
Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152 N.W.2d 833 (1967) (general rule under common law); Sanchez v.
Board of Regents, 82 N.M. 672, 486 P.2d 608 (1971) (ruling under open records statute with no
definition of public records); Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1962). Contra, MacEwan v. Holm, 226
Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961) (en banc). The MacEwan case represented a landmark departure
from this traditional view and constituted the basic precedent for courts making preliminary data
available for inspection in other jurisdictions both under common law and statutory definitions.
E.g., Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 537, 311 A.2d 116, 118 (1973); State ex rel.
Copeland v. Cartwright, 38 Fla. Supp. 6, 10-13 (Cir. Ct. 1972); Bartels v. Roussel, 303 So. 2d
833, 837-38 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
111. Categories "d" - "f" do not require specific reference to another state law or a
standardized course of conduct as do "b" and "c." Compare notes 70-101 supra and accompany-
ing text with notes 44-69 supra and accompanying text.
112. E.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 389-90 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1972); Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116 (1973); Bartels v.
Roussel, 303 So. 2d 833 (La. Ct. App. 1974). Those jurisdictions with category "d" - "f"
definitions that hold preliminary documents are not public records seem to do so on public policy
grounds. E.g., Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 160 N.W.2d 135 (1968); Sanchez v.
Board of Regents, 82 N.M. 672, 486 P.2d 608 (1971). Category "a" definitions (see notes 44-49
supra and accompanying text) which limit availability strictly to those documents enumerated
therein, are generally construed strictly to exclude most preliminary drafts and agency
memoranda. E.g., People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17 IMI. App. 3d
1090, 309 N.E.2d 362 (1973). New York includes in its definition of public records preliminary
memoranda "constituting statistical or factual tabulations" which led to the formulation of agency
policy statements and interpretations. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 88(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
113. See generally Yankwich, Book Review, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 527, 530 (1953).
114. Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 221, 152 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1967).
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conceal from the public the key factors underlying a governmental action.
Monitoring these processes is the crux of true freedom of information. The
better approach, therefore, would be to hold such documents presumptively
open and enable custodians to apply to the courts for confidentiality rulings
on a case-by-case basis. Thus in those states which fall under categories
"d"-"f," preliminary documents should, absent a specific exemption in the
statutory definition," l5 be held to constitute public records.
IV. IF THE DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC RECORD, IS IT OPEN TO
PUBLIC INSPECTION?
The right to inspect a public record includes the right to copy and take
abstracts or make photographic or other mechanical reproductions. 116 Such
rights, however, are subject to an implied rule of reasonableness: the inspec-
tion is not to interfere with the ordinary business of the agency or damage the
records."17 Additionally, disclosure may still be limited in a number of ways:
115. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65, § 66.1
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(11) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Eight
states specifically exempt these public records from inspection. These are Cal. Gov't Code §
6254(a) (West Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-19(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 61.878(g) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 3(b) (v) (1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. §
192.500(2)(a) (1975); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
42.17.310(1)(i) (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The exemptions
are specifically permissive in California, Maryland and Wyoming. The exemption is limited to
documents containing "other than purely factual materials" in Oregon. In California and
Connecticut, a balancing test is promulgated. The public body must determine that "the public
interest in withholding such records ["documents" in Connecticut] clearly outweighs the public
interest in disclosure." Cal. Gov't Code § 6254(a) (West Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
1-19(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Others, such as Minnesota and New Mexico, have exempted on
judicially-mandated public policy grounds. Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 160 N.W.2d
135 (1968); Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 82 N.M. 672, 486 P.2d 608 (1971). Preliminary data
may also be closed by another statute of the state (e.g., 58 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 14-17 (1973)), and
will be subject to any general exclusion clause contained in the open records act (see section IV(A)
infra).
116. Direct-Mall Service, Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 296 Mass. 353, 5 N.E.2d 545
(1937); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 181 N.E.2d 376 (1962); Miller v.
Incorporated Village of Freeport, 81 Misc. 2d 81, 365 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 51
App. Div. 2d 765, 379 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep't 1976). Of the statutes, only Indiana does not
specifically mention the right to copy. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 5-14-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1974).
There have been no cases deciding the issue of whether charging excessive fees could constitute
bad faith or discrimination on the part of custodians. In general, those statutes which address the
matter of fees for copies will either state a specific figure, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 116, § 43.7
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976) (35%/page for legal size copies, $1/page otherwise), or state that
the fee must be reasonable (e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-205 (1974); Md. Ann. Code art.
76A, § 4(a) (1975)), or provide that the fee shall not exceed the cost of producing the copies (e.g.,
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-15 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.874(2) (Cum. Supp.
1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 149.43 (Page 1969)), or defer to a fee prescribed by statute
elsewhere (e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.17(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (1974)).
117. Rosenthal v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257 (3d Dist. 1973); Moore v.
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A. General Exclusion Clauses
Several of the statutes contain what may be referred to as general exclusion
clauses. 11 Often framed in terms of balancing the public interest in disclosure
versus the potential harm," 9 these clauses apply to all public records.
Nondisclosure will be justified if the custodian can adequately demonstrate
that the advantage of public availability will be outweighed by some harm to
the public interest as described in the particular clause.120 General exclusion
clauses may not be seized upon by the custodian to discriminate among
specific individuals or groups: 12 1 either the record is open, or it is not.
The general exclusion clauses have two negative effects. First, they make it
more costly and burdensome for the seeker to obtain access to public records.
Implicit in these clauses is that the seeker, and not the custodian, must
institute the court proceeding to compel disclosure.' 2 2 Moreover-unless the
Board of Chosen Freeholders, 76 N.J. Super. 396, 184 A.2d 748 (App. Div.), modified on other
grounds, 39 N.J. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962); Matte v. City of Winooski, 129 VL 61, 271 A.2d 830
(1970). Restrictions on the right to make or receive copies have generally thus been imposed when
harm to the records was threatened (e.g., Matte v. City of Winooski, 129 Vt. 61, 271 A.2d 830
(1970)), or when the request for copies is overly voluminous (e.g., Rosenthal v. Hansen, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 754, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257 (3d Dist. 1973)). When the document is in a nonprinted form
(such as a tape recording) it has generally been held that the agency may limit the form of copy
provided to a printed transcript. Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J. Super. 233, 217 A.2d 22 (Law
Div. 1966) (seeker could obtain transcript of tape recording but not re-recorded tapes); 56 Md.
Op. Att'y Gen. 461-64 (1971) (department may furnish printout of data processing tape rather
than supply a duplicate tape). Cf. 1970-71 Mass. Op. Att'y Gen. 43-46 (seeker may use agency
computer terminal to inspect contents thereof). See also discussion of editing when a document
contains both public and confidential information in section IV(D) infra.
118. Cal. Gov't Code § 6255 (West Supp. 1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(2)(a)
(1974) (only as to certain public records); Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 3(b) (1975) (only as to certain
public records); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (only as to certain public
records). Connecticut formerly had such a general exclusion clause, Act of June 21, 1957, no. 428,
§ 2, [1957] Conn. Pub. Acts 564 (repealed June 3, 1975). See notes 218-19 infra and accompany-
ing text.
119. E.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 6255 (West Supp. 1977). "The agency shall justify withholding
any record by demonstrating that the record in question is exempt under express provisions of this
chapter or that on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making the
record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record." Id.
120. Embarassment to a particular officer is generally not a sufficient basis to deny inspec-
tion. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.340 (2) (Supp. 1975); Turner v. Reed, 22 Ore. App.
177, 193, 538 P.2d 373, 381 (1975).
121. Quad-City Community News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8, 15 (S.D. Iowa
1971); Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 656-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113 (3d
Dist. 1974).
122. E.g., Act of June 21, 1957, no. 428, § 2, [1957] Conn. Pub. Acts 564 (repealed June 3,
1975). This provision was repealed in Connecticut in a substantial revision of the state's open
records act in 1975. See notes 218-19 infra and accompanying text. Possible factors leading to the
repeal arose in the hearings on the revised legislation: 'I emphasize that the remedy for partial
and unbalanced disclosure is not noticed in your bill at all, but it's rather a full disclosure-more
disclosure. As long as you leave it within the discretion of the public agencies, police departments
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statutory exclusions are limited and exclusive 23-summary judgment is un-
likely, as the interests described in the exclusion clause must be weighed.
Second, it gives the custodian, in the first instance, the power to promulgate
exceptions to the state's legislative mandate. This is a power which, absent
the general exclusion clause, has been traditionally reserved to and sparingly
exercised by the courts.
A better approach to the general exclusion clause is that of Colorado, Iowa,
Maryland and Wyoming. 124 These statutes provide that if a custodian (and in
Iowa, apparently the subject of the record as well) believes that disclosure of a
particular record would do substantial harm to the public interest, he may
apply to a state court for an order restricting disclosure. Such a provision
places the burden of initiating court proceedings where it properly belongs-
on the custodian seeking to exempt himself from an otherwise clear legislative
mandate. It also eliminates the delay inherent in a procedure requiring two
public interest determinations, i.e., from both the agency and the court. 12 -
The state of Washington has enacted what can be referred to as a reverse
general exclusion clause. As with all open records acts, certain exemptions to
the disclosure requirement are promulgated.1 26 However, Washington pro-
vides that these otherwise exempt records can be made public under certain
circumstances:
Inspection or copying of any specific records, exempt under the provisions of this
section, may be permitted if the superior court in the county in which the record is
maintained finds, after a hearing with notice thereof to every person in interest and the
agency, that the exemption of such records, is clearly unnecessary to protect any
individual's right of privacy or any vital governmental function. 127
Under this provision, the seeker must apply to the court should he attempt to
overcome the statutory presumption of nondisclosure. This clause does for the
seeker what the general exclusion clause does for the custodian-it provides a
and others to dispense and disseminate only that information which they for their own purposes
think the public should know, and you have partial disclosure. And partial disclosure Is very
dangerous and I think the remedy for it is full disclosure and openness." Testimony of Charles
Mackriski, Hearings on Senate Bills 530 and 509 before the Joint Comm. on Government
Administration & Policy, April 8, 1975 at 333-34 [hereinafter cited as Connecticut hearings]. The
new Act contains no provision for a general exclusion clause. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-15 to
-21k (Cum. Supp. 1976).
123. Texas constitutes an example of a state where the statutory exemptions are deemed by
express provision to be exclusive. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (Cum. Spjpp.
1976); see Texas Indus. Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation of the South, 526 S.W.2d 211, 218
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-840).
124. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(6) (1974); Iowa Code Ann. § 68A.8 (1973); Md. Ann.
Code art. 76A, § 3(t) (1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692. 3(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
125. This would probably be particularly true where, as in Colorado and Maryland, reasons
for denial must be stated in writing to the seeker. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(4) (1974);
Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 3(d) (1975).
126. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.310(1) (Supp. 1975).
127. Id. § 42.17.310(3).
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mechanism by which, under unusual circumstances, the statutory presump-
tion (here of confidentiality) can be overcome.
Although these provisions have the effect of further complicating the
process of obtaining inspection, they nevertheless do serve a public purpose.
The presence or absence of a general exclusion clause-and the reverse clause
of Washington-constitute a legislative realization that given the increasing
specialization of governmental work, across the board characterization of an
entire class of public records will not in every instance fulfill legislative intent
or wise social policy. Such provisions, however, should place the burden of
commencing court action to exempt the exceptional document on the party
seeking to depart from the statutory norm by invoking the clause. Finally,
courts-not custodians-should be the ultimate arbiters.128
B. "Official Information" Privilege
Also relevant to the confidentiality of certain public records are statu-
tory12 9 or common law130 evidentiary privileges for "official information"
applicable in a litigation context, i.e., information disclosed in confidence to a
public officer "in the performance of [his] duties, where the public interest
requires that such confidential communications or the sources should not be
divulged. '131
128. In the exercise of equitable authority, courts may exempt public records from disclosure,
regardless of apparent statutory mandate, on public policy grounds. One example occurred in
Florida where public inspection of confidential state personnel records was at issue. Such records
were not specifically exempt from the terms of the Florida open records act. Fla. Stat. Ann. §
119.01-.12 (Cum. Supp. 1976). However, the state Attorney General held such records public as
falling within the statutory definition of any document "made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency." Id. at. §
119.011. E.g., 1975 Fla. Att'y Gen. Annual Rep. 11-12; 1974 Fla. Att'y Gen. Annual Rep.
396-98; 1973 Fla. Att'y Gen. Annual Rep. 82-85, 340-41. When the issue of inspection of
personnel records reached the Florida courts, however, an appellate court ruled such records
exempt from disclosure on public policy, and not statutory grounds: "[Tlhe right to know must
occasionally be circumscribed when the potential damages far outweigh the possible benefits. In
our opinion, to require public disclosure of personnel files of governmental employees could result
in irreparable harm to the public interest and would be against the public policy.. . . While
personnel records are not exempt from Chapter 119 [the Florida open records act] by the specific
language, we believe that public policy clearly dictates that they be deemed confidential. In the
absence of more specific language to the contrary, we do not believe that in enacting this chapter
the legislature contemplated that the personnel records of government employees should be open
for public disclosure by any citizen of this state." Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co., 310 So.
2d 345, 348-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas
Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683 (Tex. 1976), petition for cert. riled, 45 U.S.L.W. 3516
(U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-840) ("[If a governmental unit's action in making its records
available to the general public would be an invasion of an individual's freedom from the
publicizing of his private affairs, then the information in those records should be deemed
confidential by judicial decision . . . .
129. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1040 (West 1966).
130. E.g., Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 316 N.E.2d 301, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1974); People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Ist Dep't 1955).
131. People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 153, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562, 565 (1st Dep't 1955).
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The "official information" privilege, which may be asserted only by the
agency and not an informant or subject of the record, 32 will usually result in
a balancing of public interests by the courts on the disclosure question similar
to that resulting from an application of a general exclusion clause. 133 In
California, for example, a statute codifies the privilege 134 and provides that it
is absolute if disclosure is forbidden by a federal or state statute and
conditional otherwise.135 In the latter instance, the statute mandates a balanc-
ing of whether "there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the
information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of
justice .... "136 Guidelines for this determination were promulgated recently
by the California Supreme Court:
Implicit in each assessment is a consideration of the consequences--i.e., the conse-
quences to the litigant of nondisclosure, and the consequences to the public of
disclosure. The consideration of consequences to the litigant vill involve matters ...
including the importance of the material sought to the fair presentation of the litigant's
case, the availability of the material to the litigant by other means, and the effective-
ness and relative difficulty of such other means. The consideration of the consequences
of disclosure to the public will involve matters relative to the effect of disclosure upon
the integrity of public processes and procedures . ... 137
Open records statutes, although supplementing any evidentiary rules
relating to the inspection of government documents, defer by their terms to
more specific expressions of legislative interest. 138 Thus, as in California,
when the privilege is codified, it may be assumed that the open records statute
will not provide a means to defeat the privilege. 139 Where the "official
information" privilege is common law and not statutory, however, the issue is
more difficult.
Two approaches have been taken to the problem of reconciling open
records acts and common law evidentiary privileges such as that for "official
information." The Vermont approach specifically exempts from its definition
132. Richards v. Superior Court, 258 Cal. App. 2d 635, 638, 65 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920 (2d
Dist. 1968).
133. See section IV(A) supra.
134. Cal. Evid. Code § 1040 (West 1966).
135. Id.; Shepherd v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 107, 123, 550 P.2d 161, 170, 130 Cal. Rptr.
257, 266 (1976) (en banc).
136. Cal. Evid. Code § 1040(b)(2) (West 1966).
137. Shepherd v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 107, 126, 550 P.2d 161, 171-72, 130 Cal. Rptr.
257, 267-68 (1976) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
138. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
139. Indeed, the California open records act by its specific terms exempts "[rlccords the
disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to provisions of federal or state law,
including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege." Cal. Gov't
Code § 6254(k) (West Supp. 1976). The interrelationship between the two statutes is discussed In
Comment, The California Public Records Act: The Public's Right of Access to Governmental
Information, 7 Pac. L.J. 105, 122-25 (1976). See also Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.500(2)(c) (1975),
discussed in 36 Ore. Att'y Gen. Rep. 557-58 (1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 317(b)(4) (Cum. Supp.
1976) and notes 140-45 infra and accompanying text.
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of public records "records which, if made public pursuant to this subchapter,
would cause the custodian to violate any statutory or common law privi-
lege."'1 40 New York has adopted the same approach through judicial interpre-
tation. In Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 14 1 the New York Court of Appeals
took notice of the state's open records act but ruled in a footnote, without any
explanation, that "it [the New York open records act] does not abolish the
common law privilege for official information." *14 2 Subsequent lower court
decisions have reaffirmed this ruling, 14 3 although not always without criti-
cism. 14
Oregon, the second approach, creates, in effect, a statutory privilege for
official information within the open records statute itself by exempting from
disclosure:
Information submitted to a public body in confidence and not otherwise required by
law to be submitted, where such information should reasonably be considered confi-
dential, the public body has obliged itself in good faith not to disclose the information,
and when the public interest would suffer by the disclosure .... 141
The goal of open records statutes is diametrically opposed to that of the
official information privilege: the former provides impetus towards full
disclosure while the latter helps to insure that certain information will not be
divulged. It is hard to discern why Vermont, New York and Oregon have
apparently determined that in all cases where privilege conflicts with the open
records mandate, the policies favoring disclosure will never prevail. In such
circumstances, it is submitted, courts should balance the interests involved on
a case-by-case basis, assisted perhaps, by guidlines promulgated by the
legislature.
C. Public Records Specifically Exempted From Inspection by the Open
Records Acts
Apart from such general exclusion clauses and privileges, all open records
statutes exempt specific public records from inspection. The only exemption
common to all forty-eight states is the prohibition against disclosing those
documents made confidential by a federal or another state law.146 A number
of exemptions are common to many of the statutes. These may be roughly
grouped as follows: Adoption, juvenile, parole, medical or mental records;
140. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 317(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
141. 35 N.Y.2d 113, 316 N.E.2d 301, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1974).
142. Id. at 117 n.1, 316 N.E.2d at 303 n.1, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4 n.l.
143. Martinez v. Libous, 85 Misc. 2d 186, 189, 378 N.Y.S.2d 917, 920 (Sup. CL 1975);
Farrel v. Village Bd. of Trustees, 83 Misc. 2d 125, 128, 372 N.Y.S.2d 905, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
144. Burke v. Yudelson, 81 Misc. 2d 870, 874, 368 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1975), afi'd
mem., 51 App. Div. 2d 673, 378 N.Y.S.2d 165 (4th Dep't 1976) ("a perplexing footnote . . . a
rather restrictive interpretation of the Freedom of Information [open records] Law').
145. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.500(2)(c) (1975), discussed in 36 Ore. Att'y Gen. Rep. 557-58 (1974)
and Comment, The Right to Inspect Public Records in Oregon, 53 Ore. L. Rev. 3S4, 361-62
(1974).
146. See notes 26-27 supra.
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geological information; intra or inter-agency memoranda or preliminary draft
documents; invasion of privacy-type documents; investigatory information;
land acquisition or disposition appraisals; licensing examination data; litiga-
tion involving a public body; personnel or student files; taxpayer information;
trade secrets. 14 7
D. Editing Individual Documents
A particular document may contain both confidential (or privileged) and
public information. In such circumstances, most states will require the
custodian, if possible, to delete the privileged information and allow inspec-
tion of the balance.' 48 Such disclosure is, of course, subject to an implied rule
of reason to protect the confidentiality of the exempt material. On the other
hand, the custodian should be compelled not to delete to such a degree as to
make the remaining disclosure meaningless. 14 9 In Kentucky, Oregon and
Washington, editing is mandated by statutes which provide that when a
public record contains both exempt and non-exempt material, the agency
must separate the two and make the non-exempt available for public inspec-
tion. 150 Indeed, in interpreting the Washington provision, the state Attorney
General has stated that the issue of editing must be considered before even a
specifically exempt public record can be withheld from inspection. 15 1
V. IF THE DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC RECORD OPEN TO INSPEC-
TION, IS THE SEEKER WITHIN THE CLASS OF INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM
INSPECTION RIGHTS ARE ACCORDED?
Although the common law litigation interest'1 2 is no longer required,
certain motives may preclude disclosure: commercial purposes, idle curiosity
and maliciousness. 5 3 Of the three, commercial purposes (i.e., the use of
147. For a detailed charting and state-by-state comparison of these exemptions, see Appendix
II infra.
148. Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 535-36, 311 A.2d 116, 117 (1973); State ex
rel. Youmans v. Owens, 32 Wis. 2d 11, 13, 144 N.W.2d 793, 794 (1966) (per curiam); 1976 Ohio
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-011, at 2-34. Commingling of available and confidential records presents
problems analagous to editing and, in general, the same rules apply.
149. Turner v. Reed, 22 Ore. App. 177, 186 n.8, 538 P.2d 373, 377 n.8 (1975).
150. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878(3) (Supp. 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.500(3) (1975); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.310(2) (Supp. 1975).
151. 1973 Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. Pt. 1, No. 4, at 11-12. An alternative to editing raised in a
recent California case is that of disclosure on condition, i.e., that the person receiving the
document agrees not to publish or sell it. California School Employee's Ass'n v. Sunnyvale Elem.
School Dist., 36 Cal. App. 3d 46, 65-66, 111 Cal. Rptr. 433, 445 (1st Dist. 1973). This approach
may provide a possible alternative balancing technique relative to right of privacy documents
when overriding public interests may warrant inspection.
152. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
153. Motives such as political hostility to the ruling administration were never a basis to deny
inspection otherwise available at common law. E.g., State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn.
549, 75 S.W. 948 (1903).
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governmental records to aid in the purely private pursuit of profit without any
substantial public purpose)15 4 has received by far the most attention in the
cases.
Only four statutes specifically address the issue of the seeker's purpose as
relevant to inspection. Michigan requires that inspection be accorded only to
"any person having occasion to make examination of them for any lawful
purpose." 155 Louisiana and Texas, conversely, permit no inquiry whatsoever
by the custodian into an applicant's motives. 15 6 Washington forbids an agency
"to give, sell or provide access to lists of individuals requested for commercial
purposes, and agencies shall not do so unless specifically authorized or
directed by law" 1 7 with a limited exception applicable only to professional
associations. 58
Only three states then, Louisiana, Texas and Washington, seem clear as to
when commercial purposes will justify an inspection request. Indeed, in a
recent Texas Supreme Court case,'5 9 the statute's provision relating to the
seeker's motive was cited as precluding an agency from denying inspection of
workmen's compensation claim records despite the seeker's apparent intent to
use the data to verify employment applications as a service to employers.' 60
Although no case has arisen under the Washington statute to date, the matter
was the subject of a detailed Attorney General opinion in 1975. Access to
certain motor vehicle department lists was denied since the seeker's purpose
154. "Commercial purposes" have been defined by the Attorney General of Washington as
"an intent to use [the document] ... in such a manner as to facilitate commercial activity....
The commercial purpose infers that there is 'profit-expecting' activity." 1975 Wash. Op. Att'y
Gen. PL 3, No. 15 at 10, 12. See also note 157 infra and accompanying text.
155. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.492 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Alaska is similarly worded with
respect to real estate titles. Alaska Stat. § 09.25.120 (1973) ('persons having lawful occasion") The
Virginia statute, Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342 (Cum. Supp. 1976), provided until 1974 that records
were oped only to citizens of Virginia "having a personal or legal interest in specified records."
This clause was repealed by Law of April 4, 1974, ch. 332, § 1, [1974] Va. Laws 514. See notes
216-17 infra and accompanying text.
156. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:32 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6252-17a, § 5(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
157. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.260(5) (Supp. 1975). The Washington Attorney General
has defined this provision to "prohibit an agency covered by the law from supplying the names of
natural persons in list form when the person requesting such information from the public records
of the agency intends to use it to contact or in some way personally affect the individuals
identified on the list and when the purpose of the contact would be to facilitate that person's
commercial activities." 1975 Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. PL 3, No. 15, at 10 (emphasis deleted). For the
Attorney General's definition of "commercial purpose" see note 154 supra. The Attorney General
further held that "[w]here the requester's potential commercial benefit is remote and ephemeral
and there is a clear purpose other than commercial benefit, the statute does not prohibit supplying
the information in list form." 1975 Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. Pt. 1, No. 15, at 13.
158. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.260(5) (Supp. 1975).
159. Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-840).
160. Id. at 674-75.
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was to facilitate the organization of a trade group, to identify individuals for
attempted sales and to assess credit risks and security interest holders.161
Different lists for a number of other non-commercial purposes were supplied
for inspection. 162
Where, as in most states, the statute is silent as to commercial purposes,
public policy and equitable considerations will govern, with inspection gen-
erally favored. 163 In New Jersey, for example, a corporation sought access to
workmen's compensation files to compile claim histories of individual work-
ers.164 The histories would then be sold to prospective employers. 165 Inspec-
tion for these purposes was denied by the custodian but compelled by the
state's courts which suggested that an abuse of the right to inspect should "be
isolated and dealt with directly."'1 66 This was accomplished when a subse-
quent statute was passed prohibiting inspection of workmen's compensation
records for purposes of selling reports on specific individuals. 167
Apparently, to find opinions on inspection for purposes of maliciousness
and idle curiosity dicta must be resorted to. At common law, neither purpose
was sufficient to justify inspection.1 68 Under statutory interpretation, there
has been some dicta indicating that inspection for such motives wiln not be
allowed, 169 but, until more controversies reach the courts, the issue will
remain in doubt.' 70
161. 1975 Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. Pt. 3, No. 15. See also notes 154 & 157 supra for the
Attorney General's statutory interpretation in reaching these conclusions.
162. These included the identification of competitors, the solicitation of members for a
nonprofit organization, the ascertainment of vehicle owners blocking emergency exits and "no
parking" areas and the compilation of certain statistics without contacting specific individuals.
1975 Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. Pt. 3, No. 15.
163. E.g., Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Hughes, 46 N.J. 160, 215 A.2d 529 (1965) (per
curiam), affg 83 N.J. Super. 293, 199 A.2d 656 (App. Div. 1964); 58 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 67-72
(1969); D. Head, Selected Opinions of the Attorney General of Minnesota 1961-68, at 74-75
(1968).
164. Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Hughes, 46 N.J. 160, 215 A.2d 529 (1965) (per curiam),
affg 83 N.J. Super. 293, 199 A.2d 656 (App. Div. 1964).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 166, 215 A.2d at 532.
167. Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male, 95 N.J. Super. 39, 229 A.2d 812 (App. Dlv.),
aff'd, 51 N.J. 107, 237 A.2d 880 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530 (1969). The Accident
Index Bureau cases provide an interesting study of legislative and judicial jockeying with respect
to a state's open records policy.
168. E.g., City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky.
1974) (no right of inspection "to satisfy idle curiosity or for the purpose of creating a public
scandal'); State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 246, 254, 43 S.E.2d 214, 218 (1947) ("There is no right
of inspection of a public record when the inspection is sought to satisfy a person's mere whim or
fancy, to engage in a pastime, to create scandal, to degrade another, to injure public morals, or to
further any improper or useless end or purpose.'); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893); 26
Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 136 (1955). Contra, Butcher v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 163 Pa.
Super. 343, 345, 61 A.2d 367, 368 (1948).
169. E.g., 1967 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 291; 1968 Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 656; 1974 Ohio Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 74-097, at 2-391 to -392.
170. Probably, as in most open records issues, the public policy and equitable authority of the
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Assuming one may inspect and copy public records for these purposes, this
right provides no shield or defense to an action for libel, slander or invasion of
privacy. Despite an occasional opinion to the contrary, 171 the majority view is
that the mere fact that a document is a public record constitutes no condi-
tional privilege when the document is published.
172
States are split between affording access to all persons or only to citizens of
the state. At present, twenty-five states authorize inspection by "any per-
son,"' 173 twenty limit the right to any citizen of the state,1 74 and one,
Louisiana, permits access only to any electorof the state or any taxpayer who
has paid any tax collected by or under state authority if payment was made
within one year of the date of application for inspection. 175 North Dakota and
West Virginia are unclear. 176 Limiting inspection only to citizens or other
courts will govern the ultimate rulings on a case-by-case basis. See generally Accident Index
Bureau, Inc. v. Hughes, 46 N.J. 160, 215 A.2d 529 (1965) (per curiam), aff'g 83 N.J. Super. 293,
199 A.2d 656 (App. Div. 1964); Texas Indus. Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation of the South,
526 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), aff'd, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), petition for cert. filed,
45 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-840).
171. E.g., Francois v. Capital City Press, 166 So. 2d 84 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
172. Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5 (1945); Patterson
v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); 1973 Pa. Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 47-48.
But cf. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lopez, 216 Kan. 108, 124, 531 P.2d 455, 469 (1975).
173. Alaska StaL § 09.25.120 (1973); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39.121.01(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Colo. Rev. StaL Ann. § 24-72-203 (1974); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-19 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 119.07 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 92-51 (Supp. 1975); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 116, § 43.7 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.872 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 2(a) (1975); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 66, § 10 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 24.221 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.17(4) (Cum. Supp.
1976); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 59-512 (1970); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1280 (1975), 84-712 (1971);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 239.010 (1975); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 88(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (1974); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 149.43 (Page 1969), as interpreted, 1976 Ohio
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-009, at 2-24; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.420 (1975); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann.
§ 1-27-1 (1974); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 1, § 316 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.270 (Supp. 1975); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 19.21(2) (1972), 59.14(1) (1957), as amended, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 59.14(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
174. Ala. Code tiL 41, § 145 (1959); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-2804 (1968); Cal. Gov't Code § 6253
(West Supp. 1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10003 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-2701
(1975); Idaho Code §§ 9-301 (1968), 59-1009 (1976); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 5-14-1-3 (Burns 1974); Iowa
Code Ann. § 68A.2 (1973); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-201 (1973); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 405
(1964); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91-A-4 (Supp. 1975);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47: 1A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.M. StaL Ann. § 7 1-5-1 (Supp. 1975); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 51, § 24 (1.962); Pa. Stat Ann. tiL 65, § 66.2 (1959); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-20.4 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 15-304 (1973); Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-2 (Supp. 1975); Va.
Code Ann. § 2.1-342 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
175. La. Rev. Stat. § 44:31 (1951). Cf. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51, § 24 (1962) ("citizens and
taxpayers of this State, and its sub-divisions').
176. N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18 (1960) (certain documents declared to be "public records,
open and accessible for inspection during reasonable office hours"); W. Va. Code Ann. § 29A-2-2
(1976) (certain documents shall "be made avilable [sic] for public inspection').
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subgroups seems only to narrow and frustrate the policy considerations
behind an open records act. If the processes of government are mandated to
be open, it is difficult to justify closing them to noncitizens of a state.
Apart from this general distinction, the subject of differentiations between
subgroups rarely arises.17 7 The access of newspapers has, on occasion, been
challenged, but it has been long settled that the media enjoy the same
inspection rights as the general public.1 7 8 There have been several proposals
to require the disclosure of sources or penalties for misreporting public
records,'7 9 but none has been enacted.
Corporations are generally considered citizens or persons within open
records statutes. 18 0 Other plaintiffs have included citizens groups,181 political
parties' 82 and labor unions.' 8 3 Other agencies of the state have been accorded
the same, but no greater, rights as the public in general in terms of public
records inspection.1
8 4
VI. Is THERE AN ADEQUATE JUDICIAL REMEDY (ALONG WITH CORRE-
SPONDING ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTY PROVISIONS) FOR UNJUSTIFIED
DENIAL OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS?
At common law, the writ of mandamus was the only procedural means to
enforce the right of inspection.' 85 In addition to the hurdle of satisfying
equitable defenses such as laches' 86 and unclean hands,' 8 7 the writ was
177. This is due, in large part, to the fact that discrimination among groups to whom access
was afforded has been ruled violative of the equal protection clause. McCoy v. Providence
Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951); Quad-City Community
News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
178. Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739 (1941); Meriden Record
Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn. Cir. 633, 294 A.2d 646 (1971); Department of Health v. Evansville
Printing Corp., - Ind. App. -, 332 N.E.2d 829 (1975).
179. See testimony of Rep. Bartolotta, Connecticut hearings, supra note 122, at 343-44, and
testimony of Mayor Bernard F. Bowling, Kentucky hearings, supra note 13, at 16-22.
180. E.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 6252(c) (West Supp. 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.410(3) (197S);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.020(21) (Supp. 1975).
181. E.g., Society for the Protection of N.H. Forests v. Water Supply and Pollution Control
Comm'n, 115 N.H. 192, 337 A.2d 788 (1975); Citizens for Better Educ. v. Board of Educ., 124
N.J. Super. 523, 308 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1973).
182. E.g., Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 39 Cal. App. 3d 900, 114 Cal. Rptr. 725, vacated,
42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106 (3d Dist. 1974).
183. E.g., International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947).
184. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.020(21) (Supp. 1975) includes "federal, state or
local government entit[ies] or agenc[ies], however constituted" within its definition of person. Id.
See also 56 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 353-54 (1971). But see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878(4) (Cum.
Supp. 1976) which provides: "The provisions of this section shall in no way prohibit or limit the
exchange of public records or the sharing of information between public agencies when the
exchange is serving a legitimate governmental need or is necessary in the performance of a
legitimate government function." Id.
185. See Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1356 (1929).
186. E.g., Adair v. City of North Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 66, 450 P.2d 144 (1969) (untimely
assertion of mandamus waived the remedy).
187. E.g., Texas Indus. Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation of the South, 526 S.W.2d
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wholly discretionary. 188 This led one commentator to conclude that "the right
of inspection of the most public of records is 'absolute in theory' but 'qualified
in practice."' 1 89
Today, mandamus has either lost much of its discretionary character or
been replaced by statutory procedures to compel inspection.190 Generally,
only in those states having one or two sentence open records statutes is the
extraordinary writ the only means of enforcing inspection.' 9'
Among the jurisdictions which have provided for statutory remedial proce-
dures, a number of alternatives have been promulgated, often in vary-
ing combinations. These include, preliminarily, the exhaustion of various
administrative remedies, such as demanding a written explanation from the
custodian of reasons for denial, 192 or applying either to a freedom of informa-
tion commission1 93 or to the state's Attorney General.194 Appeal to specific
state courts to obtain an injunction or order compelling disclosure is allowed, 95
211, 214-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), aff'd, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), petition for cert. friled, 45
U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-840).
188. Nolan v. McCoy, 77 R-I. 96, 73 A.2d 693 (1950).
189. Cross, supra note 14, at 31, citing State ex rel. Weliford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75
S.W. 948 (1903).
190. In some states, a declaratory judgment constitutes a possible alternative. E.g., Depart-
ment of Health v. Evansville Printing Corp., - Ind. App. -, 332 N.E.2d 829 (1975);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn. 86, 163 N.W.2d 46 (1968); Deputy Sheriffs
Mutual Aid Ass'n v. Deputy Sheriffs Merit Comm'n, 24 Utah 2d 110, 466 P.2d 836 (1970).
191. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text. Today, the states in which such statutes
do not make any provision for redress or enforcement, and thus rely on mandamus in its
traditional discretionary form, include Ala. Code tit. 41, §§ 145-47 (1959); Ga. Code Ann. §§
40-2701 to -2703 (1975); Idaho Code §§ 9-301 to -302 (1948), 59-1009 (1976); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 750.492 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.17 (1967), as amended, Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 15.17(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 59-512, 93-1001-1 to -6 (1970);
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 239.010, .020, .030 (1975) (but see Mulford v. Davey, 64 Nev. 506, 186 P.2d 360
(1947) which strongly suggests mandamus will issue as a matter of right to enforce a violation of
the state's open records act; see also note 31 supra); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 71-5-1 to -3 (Supp. 1975);
N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18 (1960); Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 24 (1962); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann.
§§ 1-27-1 to -3 (1974); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 to -3 (1953), as amended, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-26-2 (Supp. 1975); W. Va. Code Ann. § 29A-2-2 (1976). The common law jurisdictions,
Mississippi and Rhode Island, also retain the traditional discretionary writ of mandamus as the
device to enforce whatever inspection rights may exist. E.g., Daluz v. Hawskley, - R.I. -, 351
A.2d 820 (1976).
192. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(4) (1974); Md. Ann. Code art. 76A, § 3(d) (1975);
N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 88(8) (McKinney Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 318 (Cur. Supp.
1976); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.3(e) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
193. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-21i(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 88(9)
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
194. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.880(4) (Cum. Supp 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.450 (1975).
But cf. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (procedure for public
body seeking to prevent disclosure to apply to the Attorney General for an opinion).
195. Alaska Stat. § 09.25.125 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39.121.02 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-2806 (1968); Cal. Gov't Code § 6258 (West Supp. 1976); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(5) (1974); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-21i(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10005 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 92-52 (Supp. 1975) Ind. Ann. Stat. § 5-14-1-6 (Burns 1974); Iowa Code Ann.
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occasionally subject to a special statute of limitations. 196 Priority on
the court docket for such appeals is provided in a number of jurisdictions. 197
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oregon and Washington' 9" require a presumption
in favor of disclosure, placing the burden of justifying confidentiality on the
custodian.
The various enforcement and penalty provisions provided in state open
records acts also tend to be of several varieties frequently promulgated in
combinations of two or more. Only four states-Florida, Kansas, Missouri
and Nebraska-provide for impeachment or removal from office for denial of
public inspection rights. 199 A range of fines and alternative imprisonment
sentences are by far the most common provisions, with some states merely
defining refusal of inspection as a misdemeanor subject to penalties as
provided elsewhere in the statutory code. 200 Such provisions should serve as a
clear deterrent to concealment; alternative fine and imprisonment, offering
remedial flexibility to the judiciary, seem best suited to this purpose.
Provisions for the recovery of attorney fees have become increasingly
prevalent in much of the recent legislation. 20 ' Such provisions are to be
applauded for reasons emphasized in a recent ruling of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court:
§ 68A.5 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.882 (Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 44:35 (1951); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 409 (Cum Supp. 1976); Md. Ann. Code art.
76A, § 3(e) (1975); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 66, § 10(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 24.223(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-712.03 (1971); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 91-A:7 (Supp. 1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.480 (1975); Pa. Stat. Ann. it. 65, § 66.4 (Cum. Supp.
1976); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-20.4 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 8
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 319 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-346
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Vash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.340 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-692.3(f)
(Cum. Supp. 1975). Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Texas provide for redress by writ of
mandamus. However, the mandamus process in this context is clearly intended by the statutes to
be mandatory and not discretionary when the statutory prerequisites have been met. See also
notes 31 and 191 supra and accompanying text.
196. Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 1-21i (Cum. Supp. 1976) (four days to public officer, fifteen
days from officer's denial to freedom of information commission, fifteen days from commission's
denial to courts); Law of May 19, 1976, ch. 608, (1976] S.C. Acts 1629-30, amending S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-20 to 20.6 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (60 days).
197. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:35 (1951); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91-A:7 (Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.490(2) (1975); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1,
§ 319(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-346 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
198. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.882(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 66,
§ 10(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 192.490(1) (1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 42.17.340(1) (Supp. 1975).
199. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-203 (1973); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-712.03 (1971).
200. These are cataloged in Appendix H infra. Arizona provides that any aggrieved seeker
"shall have a cause of action against the officer or public body for any damages resulting" from a
denial of inspection. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-121.02(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976). In Maine, a willful
violation constitutes a Class E crime. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 410 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
201. See Appendix H infra.
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The provision for the award of attorney's fees is critical to securing the rights
guaranteed by the statute .... Without this provision, the statute would often be a
dead letter, for the cost of enforcing compliance would generally exceed the value of
the benefit gained. . . The attorney fee provision was enacted so that the public's
right to know would not depend upon the ability of individuals to finance litigation. 20 2
VII. SUMMARY-THE TREND TOwARD LIBERALITY
Freedom of information, as it relates to public inspection of state executive
documents, seems to be a continually burgeoning field with no sign of
abatement. The numerous statutes and modifications in the past decade2 03-
no statute has been repealed in this period unless superceded by a more
comprehensive enactment-evidence the trend. Among the highlights of this
period was the enactment in California of a comprehensive open records act
in 1968.204 This was the first statute to encompass "all writings containing
information relating to the conduct of the public's business," in its definition
of public records. 205 This is "e," the second broadest of the definitional
categories in as much as it does not require "official" or "public" business of
the agency as an essential factor. 20 6 Other states adopted this definition20 7
and the similarity between some of these laws and that of California is
clear.20 Thus, it appears that, with the exception of New York, 20 9 the sister
state experience-and not FOIA2 1 0-has been of upmost importance in
202. Bradbury v. Shaw, - N.H. -, 360 A.2d 123, 126 (1976). See also Douglas, The New
Hampshire Right to Know Law-An Analysis, 16 N.H.B.J. 227, 24445 (1975). Ohio, which has
no provision in its open records act for recovery of attorney fees, seems to have judicially
established a unique "public benefit" test to permit the recovery of attorney fees as well as a
"bad-faith" exception to the state's general rule that in the absence of statutory provision, attorney
fees are not recoverable. Compare State ex rel. White v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 2d 37, 295
N.E.2d 665 (1973) with State ex rel. Grosser v. Boy, 46 Ohio St. 2d 184, 347 N.E.2d 539 (1976)
(per curiam).
A different viewpoint on the issue of attorney fees is that of Connecticut. In specifically
rejecting that such a recovery provision be included in the 1975 modification of its open records
statute, the Committee on Government Administration and Policy concluded that such a
provision, especially when the fees would be awarded at the discretion of the Freedom of
Information Commission, could become a "two-way street .... That the citizen, if it were the
discretion of the Freedom of Information Commission, would have to pay the State's or the
Municipality's attorneys fees .... [Tihis would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of the
rights granted under this Act by ordinary citizens...." Hearings on Calendar 0910, 18 Conn.
House Proceedings, Pt. 8, at 3898-99 (1975).
203. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
204. Law of Aug. 29, 1968, ch. 1473, § 39, [1968] Cal. Stats. 2945 repealed the state's former
limited enactments, Law of May 25, 1951, ch. 655, § 23, (1951] Cal. Stats. 1851 and Act of
March 12, 1872, § 1032, printed in [1872] Cal. Pol. Code 183.
205. Cal. Gov't Code § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1976).
206. See notes 87-92 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 88-92 supra and accompanying text.
208. E.g., compare Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-19(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976) with Cal. GoVt Code
§ 6254 (West Supp. 1976).
209. See note 49 supra.
210. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1975).
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heralding a more open approach to public inspection of government docu-
ments across the nation. Finally, one indication of public support for a liberal
open records policy is the enactment, in 1972, of the Washington statute
through a public referendum. 2 1
1
Even when statutes were not significantly altered or amended, minor
changes in wording and redefinitions also reflected the liberal trend. Mass-
achusetts, in 1973, redefined the term public records from category "b
' 2 12
("any written or printed book or paper ... in or on which any entry has been
made or is required to be made by law"2 13) to category "f" 214 ("all [documents]
made or received by any officer or employee of any agency"2 15), a broad-scale
leap across the definitional spectrum.
Virginia and Connecticut, by repealing pre-existing clauses, also took giant
steps toward liberality. In Virginia, a 1974 enactment 2 16 repealed the qualify-
ing phrase "having a personal or legal interest in specified records" from its
proclamation that public records are open to inspection by any citizen. 21 7 In
Connecticut, a general reform of the state open records act in 1975218 repealed
a general exclusion clause which had permitted a custodian to refuse permis-
sion to inspect "if such inspection or copying would adversely affect the public
security or the financial interests of the state or any of its political subdivisions
or if such denial is necessary to provide reasonable protection to the reputa-
tion or character of any person. '2 19
Of the recent statutes, among the most comprehensive is that of Ken-
tucky. 220 The act was given impetus by the decision in City of Saint Matthews
v. Voice of Saint Matthews,2 21 which overruled much of the earlier restrictive
Kentucky law on open records. 222 The statute covers most of the points
discussed above relative to the issue of public inspection of records. It
promulgates a category "f" definition of public records 2 23 ("all [documents]
... regardless of physical form or characteristics, which are prepared, owned,
used, in the possession of or retained by a public agency'). 224 After providing
that inspection and copying rights shall be afforded to "any person, ' 225 the
211. 1972 Wash. Initiative No. 276 (approved November 7, 1972). See generally Fritz v. Gorton,
83 Wash. 2d 275, 285-86, 517 P.2d 911, 917-18 (en banc); appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
212. See notes 50-61 supra and accompanying text.
213. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26) (1973), as amended, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4,
§ 7(26) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
214. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.
215. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 4, § 7(26) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
216. Law of April 4, 1974, ch. 332, § 1, (1974] Va. Laws 514.
217. Codified as Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-342 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
218. Act of June 3, 1975, no. 75-342, [1975] Conn. Pub. Acts 444.
219. Act of June 21, 1957, no. 428, § 2, [1957] Conn. Pub. Acts 564 (repealed June 3, 1975).
220. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 61.870-.884 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
221. 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1974).
222. Id. at 815. See note 13 supra.
223. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.
224. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.870(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
225. Id. at §§ 61.872, .874.
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statute demarcates specific exemptions which may, however, "be subject to
inspection only upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction. " 226 Editing,
under applicable circumstances, is provided for,227 as are remedial228 and
enforcement and penalty provisions, 229 with the burden of proof placed upon
the custodian to sustain the withholding of the document 2 30 A final provision
allows any person access to any public record relating to or mentioning
himself subject to the exemptions so provided in general. 231
VIII. MODEL ACT
As a final summary of this study, a model state open records act appears in
Appendix I. This act is offered as one possible approach to solving many of
the problems and issues that have been discussed above. The model2 2 has
been drawn largely from what is perceived to be the best statute to date,
Kentucky's 1976 Act,233 and two pre-existing model acts drafted by research-
ers in the field of freedom of information. 2 34 Given the divergence of existing
226. Id. at § 61.878(1). Included are preliminary drafts and certain preliminary memoranda.
Id. at §§ 61.878(1)(a),(g),(h). This provision for a judicial order of inspection covers the issue of a
reverse general exclusion clause, discussed in notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text. Implicit
in the statutory mandate and the holding in City of St. Matthews is that the broad equitable
powers vested in the courts continues to act as a general exclusion clause for denying inspection.
See section IV(A) supra and accompanying text. The statute also exempts from disclosure
"[p]ublic records or information the disclosure of which is prohibited or restricted or otherwise
made confidential by enactment of the general assembly." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878(lYj)
(Cum. Supp. 1976). This provides, in effect, a legislatively-oriented general exclusion clause
should the legislature so choose to act. For a case where the legislature of New Jersey did so act to
overcome a previous court decision opening Workmen's Compensation claim records to public
inspection see Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male, 95 N.J. Super. 39, 229 A.2d 812, affd, 51
N.J. 107, 237 A.2d 880 (1968) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530 (1969).
227. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See section IV(D) supra for a
discussion of editing considerations.
228. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 61.880, .882 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Review by the state Attorney
General is provided as an administrative alternative to judicial action. Id. at § 61.882(2). This
procedural device has a positive effect in two senses: first, it screens dearly erroneous withhold-
ings, thereby reducing the caseload of the courts. Second, it provides a relatively quick and
inexpensive remedy to the denied applicant.
229. Id. at § 61.882(5). If the violation of the statute was willful, a prevailing applicant may
be awarded all costs including reasonable attorney fees. It is also within the discretion of the
courts to award up to $25 per day to the applicant for the period during which inspection or
copying rights were denied. Id.
230. Id. at §§ 61.880(2), .882(3) (unless, of course, the document is specifically exempted).
231. Id. at § 61.884. Although at first glance this provision may seem unnecessary (being a
member of the general public, he would be able to obtain access anyway), it defeats an attempted
defense by an agency relative to special circumstances or possible peculiar harm resulting from
the subject of the record seeking inspection.
232. Hereinafter referred to as Model Act.
233. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 61.870-.884 (Supp. 1976).
234. These are the Southern Governmental Monitoring Project Model State Freedom of
Information Statute and the Freedom of Information Center Model State Freedom of Information
Statute. Both are reprinted in their entirety in Amico, supra note 3, at 51-60.
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state statutes on specific records, the needs and philosophies of particular
localities, and realistic political factors, the uniform promulgation of such an
act across the various jurisdictions may be unlikely at best. However, it is
hoped that this specific model will serve as a starting point for additional
legislation which would attempt to resolve the problems and issues raised in
the case law to date.
Unlike any of the forty-eight current statutes, or the two earlier models, this
proposed act assumes no absolutes in terms of classes of records being open or
closed. Although records are defined in most broad-category "f"--terms as
documents "prepared, owned, used, retained by or ... in the possession of a
public body, '23 5 a custodian may, under section 7(e), apply within ten days of
the request for a court-ordered exemption on public policy grounds if he
believes "the public interest in nondisclosure ... clearly outweighs the public
interest in disclosure. '236 The burden of proof in such a situation is intended
to be high: the custodian must clearly demonstrate that "on the facts of the
case the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest
in disclosure. '23 7 A strong "Declaration of Policy," requiring that any excep-
tions to the open records mandate be "strictly construed, " 238 should further
work to limit the application of this provision to the exceptional case. Section
7(e) comes into play only after there has been a specific request for a
document and calls for an alternative proceeding to be instituted by the
custodian. It may not be asserted by way of defense or counterclaim.
Conversely, none of the exceptions to the open records policy, which are
promulgated in section 5(a), are absolute. In what is perhaps the act's most
innovative feature, a procedure is established for a particular seeker to
overcome the statutory presumption of confidentiality of the specifically
exempted public records. 239 A "section 5(a) proceeding" constitutes the proce-
dure and, in such an action (which may be brought before the state Attorney
General or the state courts at the seeker's option), 240 the burden of proof
relative to availability is shifted from the custodian to the seeker. 241 However,
the seeker's burden is not as strong-whereas the custodian must establish
that the public interest in nondisclosure "clearly outweighs" that of disclosure,
the word "clearly" is dropped from the seeker's burden. He must merely
demonstrate by a bare preponderance of credible evidence that the public
interest in disclosure outweighs that in nondisclosure. 242 Additionally, the
seeker is aided by the strong Declaration of Policy favoring openness as a
guideline for judicial construction. 243 In short, it will be easier for the seeker
235. Model Act, supra note 232, at § 2. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.
236. Model Act, supra note 232, at § 7(e). Such a clause is discussed at section IV(A) supra
and accompanying text.
237. Model Act, supra note 232, at § 7(e).
238. Id. at § 1.
239. Id. at § 5(a).
240. See generally id. at §§ 6, 7.
241. Id. at § 5(a).
242. Id.
243. Id. at § 1.
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to rebut the specific presumption of confidentiality where the act so provides
than for the custodian to rebut the general presumption of availability for a
nonexempt public record.
Procedurally, the denied seeker has an alternative of remedies. He may
apply for a quick (and presumably less expensive) determination by the state
Attorney General relative to the merits of disclosure 2 4 or he may proceed
directly with court action.2 45 Should he choose the Attorney General option,
only to be denied again in his application for inspection, he may nevertheless
institute court proceedings for a de novo judicial determination.2 46 The
Attorney General mechanism is intended only as a swift, inexpensive alterna-
tive to the applicant. An agency may appeal the decision of either the
Attorney General or the trial court,247 but a successful applicant in such
subsequent proceeding shall be awarded all court costs and reasonable
attorney fees from the agency. 2 " Fees may be awarded even if the applicant
is unsuccessful if the custodian continues to wrongfully withhold the docu-
ment and does not initiate proceedings on his own pursuant to the act. 2 49
Whenever an applicant seeks review of an agency's denial of inspection of a
government document-whether made to the Attorney General or the
courts-a preliminary determination must be made as to whether the action of
the seeker constitutes a section 5(a) proceeding, i.e., whether the document
being sought constitutes a public record and "clearly falls within one of the
exempted categories of public records enumerated in sections 5(a)(1)-(10). '" s0
If the categorization of the public record is doubtful or uncertain, the action
shall not constitute a section 5(a) proceeding and the burden of proof shall
remain with the custodian. To avoid delay, this initial determination, pre-
liminary to full hearing on the merits, may not be appealed as a final order
and may in no circumstances be considered apart from the merits by a higher
court. It merely constitutes a determination of the procedural and remedial
framework in which the trial on the merits will be conducted.25s As discussed
above, it seems only proper that the party seeking to rebut the statutory
presumption of availability or nondisclosure should bear the burden of
proof.252
Provisions for editing, 25 3 severability in the event of judicial declaration of
partial invalidity, 25 4 and access to records concerning oneself25s are provided.
The specific exemptions enumerated in section 5(a) are merely suggestive, and
244. Id. at § 6.
245. Id. at § 7.
246. Id. at §§ 7(a)-(b).
247. Id. at § 7(d).
248. Id. at § 7(f).
249. Id.
250. Id. at §§ 6(a), 7(b).
251. Id.
252. See text following note 127 supra.
253. Model Act, supra note 232, at § 5(c).
254. Id. at § 10.
255. Id. at § 9.
1977] 1141
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
are by no means exhaustive of the broad present spectrum of exemptions or
alternatives available to particular state legislatures.
One final innovative provision of the model act concerns the problem of the
common law "official information" privilege discussed above. 256 Such privi-
leges are not automatically abrogated by this act but, rather, may be deferred
to in an action brought by the custodian to assert the privilege within ten days
after a request to inspect has been made2 s 7 (common law privilege may not be
asserted by way of defense of counterclaim in a proceeding brought by a
seeker to compel inspection because, again, the burden of instituting a
proceeding attempting to rebut the statutory mandate of disclosure should rest
with the custodian 2SS). To sustain nondisclosure by virtue of the privilege, the
custodian must demonstrate that the privilege is clearly applicable to the
document in question and that "on the facts of the particular case the public
interest in nondisclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosure. " 25 9 Note
that this action available to the custodian is separate and apart from the
general "public policy" appeal of section 7(e), and relates only to the issue of
privilege. Given the history of judicial acceptance of the privilege as a basis to
deny inspection of public records, the burden of proof required to sustain
nondisclosure on the basis of privilege is lower than that of the general
exclusion clause of section 7(e). The custodian must only demonstrate that the
public interest in nondisclosure pursuant to the privilege "outweighs" that of
disclosure, 260 not, as in section 7(e), that the latter is "clearly out-
weigh[ed]. 261
IX. CONCLUSION
The open records issue in the states amounts essentially to a balancing of
the public's right to know and to monitor the conduct of its public servants on
the one hand against the need to maintain confidentiality in government
processes and to protect the reputation and privacy of individuals on the
other.262 From all appearances, the balancing has tended to become more of a
groping-a response to the successes and failures of sister states with individ-
ual modifications tailored to local conditions which in turn serve as models for
subsequent legislation. The explosion of freedom of information in the past
decade in no way constitutes the culmination of the process or even its most
efficient and socially useful form. The open records policy will always reflect
the priorities and values of the society-at-large and be a function thereof. The
common law jurisdictions of Mississippi and Rhode Island-as well as those
256. Id. at § 5(b). See section IV(B) supra.
257. Model Act, supra note 232, at § 5(b).
258. See text following note 127 supra.
259. Model Act, supra note 232, at § 5(b).
260. Id.
261. Id. at § 7(e).
262. One California court described the objectives of the state open records act as "includ[Ing)
preservation of islands of privacy upon the broad seas of enforced disclosure." Black Panther
Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 653, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1974).
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which have enacted only limited legislation 263-should continue to benefit
from the ongoing developments in this area. Liberalization of statutory and
common law in these jurisdictions seems only a matter of time.
William Randolph Henrick
263. See generally note 191 supra.
APPENDIX I
Model State Open Records Act
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.
The Legislature of -, although mindful of the right of individuals to
privacy, hereby finds and declares that access to information concerning the
conduct of public servants in conducting the people's business is a fundamen-
tal and necessary right of every person in this State. It is thereby declared to
be the public policy of - that public records shall be readily accessible for
examination and copying by any person, with certain exceptions provided
under this Act for the protection of the public interest.
Courts shall take into account the policy of this Act that free and open
examination of public records is a fundamental and necessary right of every
person and in the public interest. Such exceptions provided for by this Act or
otherwise provided by law shall be strictly construed, even though examina-
tion of public records may cause inconvenience or embarassment to public
officials or others. Courts may examine any public record in camera in any
proceeding brought under this Act.
SECTION 2. Definitions.
As used in this Act
"Business days" means all calendar days excluding Saturdays, Sundays and
legal public holidays.
"Custodian" means the official custodian or any authorized person having
personal custody or control of a public record.
"Official custodian" means the chief administrative officer or other em-
ployee of a public body who is responsible for the maintenance, care and
keeping of public records, regardless of whether such records are in his actual
custody or control.
"Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, organiza-
tion or association, regardless of citizenship or residence in this state.
"Person in interest" means the person who is the subject of a public record,
or mentioned in any identifiable manner therein, or any representative
designated by said person, except that if such person be under a legal




"Public body" means every state or local officer, agency, department,
division, bureau, board, commission and authority; every legislative board,
committee, commission and officer, every county, city and municipal govern-
ing body, council, school district board, special district board, municipal
corporation and any board, department, commission, committee, subcommit-
tee, ad hoc committee, council or agency thereof; and any other body which is
created by state or local authority in the executive or legislative branches of
government, or which derives at least twenty-five per cent (25%) of its funds
from state or local authority.
"Public record" means any book, writing, paper, map, photograph, card,
tape, disc, sound recording, drawing, film or other documentary or
information-containing material, data or recording, regardless of physical
form or characteristics, which has been prepared, owned, used, retained by or
is in the possession of a public body.
SECTION 3. Public Records Open to Inspection and
Copying by any Person.
(a) Any person shall have the right to inspect or copy any public record of
any public body during the regular office hours of the public body except as
otherwise expressly provided by Section 5 of this Act (exceptions). The
exercise of this right may be subject only to such reasonable limitations
established by the custodian for the physical protection of the records them-
selves or so as not to unreasonably disrupt the essential functions of the public
body. The custodian may require written application describing the records to
be inspected.
(b) Any public body, upon request for the inspection of public records
pursuant to this Act, shall within ten business days of the receipt of such
request, notify the person making the request of the public body's determina-
tion and, if denying inspection or copying, state the reasons therefore,
including a statement of the specific exception authorizing the withholding of
the record and a brief explanation of how the exception applies to the record
withheld. Such statement shall constitute the final opinion of the public body
as to the public availability of the requested document and a copy shall be
forwarded immediately to the state Attorney General by the public body.
(c) If the public employee to whom the application for inspection is
directed does not have custody or control of the public record requested and is
not the official custodian, such employee shall so notify the applicant and
shall furnish the name and location of the custodian of the public record, if
such facts are known to him.
(d) If the public record is in active use, in storage, or not otherwise
immediately available, the official custodian shall notify the applicant within
five business days from receipt of the application and shall designate the
earliest practical date and time, and arrange a mutually convenient place, for
inspection of the public record.
(e) Upon inspection, any person shall have the right to make abstracts of
the public records and memoranda thereof, and to obtain copies, transcripts
or print-outs from the public body. Such copies shall be provided as soon as is
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reasonably practical. No person shall remove original copies of public records
from the office of any public body without the written permission of the
official custodian.
(f) The public body may establish and collect reasonable fees for making
copies not to exceed the actual cost thereof, not including the cost of staff
required. Fees shall not be charged for examination or review to determine if
such documents are subject to disclosure.
SECTION 4. Public Body to Adopt Rules and Regulations.
(a) Each public body shall adopt rules and regulations in conformity with
the provisions of this Act to provide full access to public records, to protect
public records from damage and disorganization, to prevent excessive disrup-
tion of its essential functions, to provide assistance and information upon
request and to insure efficient and timely action in response to applications for
inspection, and such rules and regulations shall include, but shall not be
limited to:
(1) The principal office of the public body and its regular office hours;
(2) The title and address of the official custodian of the public body's
records;
(3) The fees, to the extent authorized by this Act or otherwise provided by
law, to be charged for copies;
(4) The procedures to be followed in requesting public records.
(b) Each public agency shall display a copy of its rules and regulations
pertaining to public records in a prominent location accessible to the public.
SECTION 5. Public Records Exempt From Disclosure Except Upon Deci-
sion of Attorney General or Order of Court; Procedure.
(a) The public records enumerated in this subsection shall be exempt from
disclosure and may be subject to inspection or copying only upon decision of
the state Attorney General or an order of a court of competent jurisdiction
resulting from proceedings commenced by any person seeking inspection or
copying of such records in accordance with the procedural provisions of
sections 6 and 7 of this Act [such a proceeding hereinafter shall be referred to
as a section 5(a) proceeding]. Notice of any section 5(a) proceeding shall be
given to every person in interest and to the public body. In any section 5(a)
proceeding, the burden of proof shall be upon the person seeking inspection to
establish that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in
nondisclosure. Provisions under sections 7 and 8 of this Act relating to the
recovery of costs and attorney fees, and the enumerated penalty provisions of
removal or impeachment, fine, imprisonment and monetary awards to the
seeker shall be inapplicable to any section 5(a) proceeding except as provided
in section 7(f). The following public records are exempt from disclosure except
upon such Attorney General decision or court order resulting from a section
5(a) proceeding:
(1) Public records specifically exempted from disclosure by any federal or
state statute;
(2) Public records containing information of a purely personal nature
1977] 1145
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
where the public disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. Examples of records which may contain this
information, without limiting the application of this subsubsection to other
such records, include adoption, juvenile, medical, mental, personnel and
parole records;
(3) Investigatory files or records of law enforcement agencies or other
public bodies involved in administrative adjudication that were compiled in
the process of detecting and investigating statutory or regulatory violations, if
the disclosure of the information would harm the public body by revealing the
identity of informants not otherwise known, or by disclosing investigatory
techniques not otherwise known outside the government, or by prematurely
releasing information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action or
administrative adjudication. This subsection shall not be used by the custo-
dian of the records to delay or impede the exercise of rights granted by this
Act;
(4) Test questions, scoring keys and other data used to administer a
licensing examination, examination for employment, or academic examina-
tion. However, an examinee shall have the right to review his own completed
examination;
(5) The contents of real estate appraisals, engineering or feasibility esti-
mates and evaluations made for or by the state or any public body relative to
the acquisition of property or any interest in property for public use, or to
prospective public supply and construction contracts, until such time as title
to the property has been acquired or the property interest has passed to the
state or a public body, provided the law of eminent domain shall not be
affected by this provision;
(6) "Trade secrets" which may include, but are not limited to, any
formula, plan, pattern, process, tool, mechanism, compound, procedure,
production data, or compilation of information which is not patented, which
is known only to certain individuals within a commercial concern who are
using it to facilitate, produce or compound an article of trade or a service
having commercial value and which gives its user an opportunity to obtain a
business advantage over competitors who do not know or use it;
(7) Records pertaining to pending claims or litigation to which the public
body is a party until such claim or litigation has been finally adjudicated or
otherwise settled, provided no other inspection or discovery rights relating to
the production of documents in claims or litigation to which the public body
is a party shall be effected by this provision;
(8) The specific details of bona fide research projects being conducted by a
state institution;
(9) Library, museum or other charitable contribution material contributed
by private persons, to the extent of any limitations placed thereon as condi-
tions of such contributions;
(10) Public records or information the disclosure of which is prohibited or
restricted or otherwise made confidential by enactment of the Legislature.
(b) In accordance with the procedures provided in section 7, and not-
withstanding the specific exemptions of subsection (a) of this section, any
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custodian of any public record may seek to restrict or deny disclosure of such
public record in whole or in part on the ground that such record or
information therein falls within a common law privilege of confidentiality.
The burden of instituting such proceedings shall fall upon the official custo-
dian of the public record by applying to the - Court within ten business days
for an order permitting him to restrict disclosure on grounds of such privilege.
Such order will not issue and inspection will not be denied unless the official
custodian demonstrates the clear applicability of the privilege and that on the
facts of the particular case the public interest in nondisclosure outweighs the
public interest in disclosure. Notice of such action shall be given to the person
seeking inspection, the public body and every person in interest. The provi-
sions of this subsection relating to common law privilege may not be asserted
as a defense or counterclaim to any action brought by a person to compel
disclosure but, rather, must be asserted in a separate previous action insti-
tuted by the official custodian.
(c) The exemptions provided in this section shall be inapplicable to the
extent that information, the disclosure of which is excepted by this section,
can be deleted from the specific records sought. In such a case, the public
body shall separate the exempted and make the nonexempted material
available for examination. The fact that a document has been edited shall be
noted conspicuously on its face and sections where deletions have been made
shall be marked by ". . ".
SECTION 6. Denial of Inspection-Role of Attorney General.
(a) Any person denied inspection of any public record pursuant to the
terms of this Act may appeal within thirty business days to the state Attorney
General for a review of the denial. Within ten business days, the Attorney
General shall issue a written opinion to the public body and the applicant
stating whether such public body acted consistently with the provisions of this
Act and shall either affirm, reverse or modify the public body's decision to
withhold the document. The Attorney General may seek additional documen-
tation from the public body and may examine the document in camera before
making his determination. Preliminarily, the Attorney General must make a
determination as to whether the applicant's request constitutes a section 5(a)
proceeding. If the Attorney General finds that the record sought clearly falls
within one of the exempted categories of public records enumerated in
sections 5(a)(1) - (10) of this Act, he shall declare the request a section 5(a)
proceeding and make further determinations on the merits of the application
in accordance with the rules enumerated in section 5(a) relative to burden of
proof. In no instance may the Attorney General award court costs, attorney
fees or penalize the custodian or public body in any manner. A determination
by the Attorney General that the seeker's request constitutes a section 5(a)
proceeding shall not be appealable in and of itself but rather may be reviewed
in any subsequent court proceedings only in conjunction with a full determi-
nation on the merits. The determination of the character of the proceeding
shall be ruled upon preliminarily and summarily by the court in any subse-
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quent court proceedings brought after the Attorney General has rendered his
final decision, as a basis to determine the character of the primary proceeding
on the merits of public inspection.
(b) In the event a person feels the intent of this Act is being subverted by
an agency short of denial of inspection, including but not limited to the
imposition of excessive fees or the misdirection of the applicant, the person
may complain in writing to the Attorney General and the complaint shall be
subject to the same adjudicatory process as if the record had been denied.
(c) In order for the - Courts of this state to exercise their jurisdiction to
enforce the provisions of this Act as provided in section 7, it shall not be
necessary to have forwarded any request for documents to the Attorney
General pursuant to this section. A denied applicant may employ directly the
judicial procedures provided in section 7.
SECTION 7. Denial of Inspection-Judicial Review and Action.
(a) The - Courts of this state shall have jurisdiction to enforce the
purposes of this Act by injunction, declaratory judgment or other appropriate
order on the application of any person either directly, or for a de novo trial
after a determination from the Attorney General pursuant to section 6. The -
Courts shall also have jurisdiction to deny inspection when proper under the
specific provisions of this Act on the application of any public body as
provided in this section or subsection 5(b). Except as otherwise provided by
law or rule of court, proceedings arising under this Act shall take precedence
on the docket over all other cases and be assigned for trial at the earliest
practicable date. In any proceeding not declared by the court to be a section
5(a) proceeding, the burden of proof shall be on the public body to justify its
act of nondisclosure.
(b) Any person denied inspection of any government document by a public
agency may apply to the - Court for a de novo trial seeking an order to
enforce his rights to inspect or receive a copy of any public record under the
terms of this Act. Such proceeding must be brought within thirty business
days of receipt of the public body's notification of denial, or within thirty
business days of receipt of an affirmance or modification of such denial by the
state Attorney General pursuant to section 6 of this Act, or within sixty
business days if the public body has wrongfully withheld the public record or
any part thereof by continuing to refuse inspection and not instituting court
proceedings within ten business days pursuant to subsection (e) of this section
or section 5(b) of this Act after a determination by the state Attorney General
that disclosure of the public record or any part thereof is required by the
terms of this Act. Such court shall preliminarily and summarily determine de
novo whether the record sought clearly falls within one of the exempted
categories of public records enumerated in sections 5(a)(1) - (10). If the court
so finds, it shall declare the primary proceeding on the merits to be a section
5(a) proceeding and subject to the provisions of section 5(a) of this Act. Such
preliminary determination shall not be appealable to the - Court as a final
1148 [Vol. 45
STATE OPEN RECORDS
order but rather may be reviewed on appeal only in conjunction with a full
determination on the merits. Any noncompliance with the order of the court
may be punished as contempt of court.
(c) In the event a person feels the intent of this Act is being subverted by a
public body short of denial of inspection, including but not limited to the
imposition of excessive fees or the misdirection of the applicant, the person
may institute proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other appropriate
relief in the - Court and such proceeding shall be subject to the same
adjudicatory process as if the record had been denied.
(d) Any public body determined by the state Attorney General or
Court, pursuant to section 6, to be wrongfully withholding any public record
or portion thereof from public inspection in accordance with the provisions of
this Act shall comply with such determination in full by producing such
documents for inspection within ten business days, unless within the ten day
period the public body issues notice of its intention to institute proceedings for
injunctive, declaratory, appellate, or other appropriate relief with the
Court. Copies of the notice shall be sent to the Attorney General and, by
certified mail, to the petitioner at the address stated on the petition. The
public body shall institute proceedings within ten business days after it issues
its notice of intention to do so.
(e) If, in the opinion of the custodian of any public record, the public
interest in nondisclosure of the particular record clearly outweighs the public
interest in disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that such record might oth-
erwise be available to public inspection, he may apply to the - Court within
ten business days of the request for inspection for an order permitting him to
restrict such disclosure. After a hearing, with notice given to the seeker who
shall have the right to appear and be heard, the court may issue an
appropriate order restricting disclosure upon a finding that on the facts of the
case the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest
in disclosure. The provisions of this subsection relating to nondisclosure on
public interest grounds may not be asserted as a defense or counterclaim to
any action brought by a person to compel disclosure but, rather, must be
asserted in a separate previous action instituted by the official custodian.
(f) If any person seeking the right to inspect or receive a copy of any
public record prevails in any proceeding brought pursuant to this Act, such
person shall be awarded all costs of litigation including reasonable attorney
fees, except as provided in section 5(a). If such person prevails in part, the
court may in its discretion award him reasonable attorney fees or an appropri-
ate portion thereof except as provided in section 5(a). However, irrespective of
the character of the proceeding, if such person has instituted proceedings to
compel inspection after a public body has wrongfully withheld the public
record or any part thereof by continuing to refuse inspection and not filing
notice of its intention to institute court proceedings within ten business days
pursuant to this section or section 5(b) of this Act, and/or has not in fact so
instituted such proceedings within ten additional business days after a deter-
mination by the state Attorney General that disclosure of the public record or
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any part thereof is required by the terms of this Act, such person shall be
awarded all costs of litigation including reasonable attorney fees whether or
not he prevails in such proceeding.
SECTION 8. Penalties.
(a) Any custodian who willingly and knowingly violates the provisions of
this Act shall be subject to suspension, removal or impeachment. He shall
also be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ninety days, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
(b) In addition, when any person seeking the right to inspect any public
record prevails against a public body in any court action, in full or in part, it
shall be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not
to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) for each day that he was denied the right to
inspect such public record. The costs or award shall be paid by such
custodian or public body as the court shall determine is responsible for the
violation.
SECTION 9. Person's Access to Records Relating to Himself.
Any person shall have access to any public record relating to him or in
which he is mentioned by name, upon presentation of appropriate identifica-
tion, subject to the provisions of section 5(a).
SECTION 10. Severability.
If any provision of this article or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances is adjudged invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such
judgment shall not affect or impair the validity of the other provisions of the
article or the application thereof.
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